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ENTITY AND IDENTITY 
Usha Rodrigues∗ 
ABSTRACT 
The function, indeed the very existence, of nonprofit corporations is 
undertheorized.  Recent literature suggests that only preferential tax treatment 
adequately accounts for the persistence of the nonprofit form.  This 
explanation is incomplete.  Drawing on psychology’s social identity theory, 
this Article posits that the nonprofit form can create a special “warm-glow” 
identity that cannot be replicated by the for-profit form.  For example, a local 
nonprofit food cooperative sells more than the free-range eggs or organic 
strawberries that Whole Foods and other for-profits market so effectively.  The 
co-op offers community participation and an investment in local farms, a 
distinctive ethos that is incompatible with the profit motive.  Ascribing a 
special meaning to the nonprofit form allows us to view afresh a variety of 
issues regarding the appropriate legal treatment of nonprofits. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The distinction between nonprofit organizations and for-profit firms is 
blurring before our eyes.  Corporate social responsibility, sustainability, and 
green movements have made doing good an important component of many 
products offered not only by nonprofits, but also by for-profit firms.  
Economists call “warm glow” the utility one derives from giving.1  
Increasingly, for-profit corporations sell us warm glow.  Consider Starbucks’s 
description of its Shared Planet initiative: 
It’s our commitment to do things that are good to each other and 
the planet.  From the way we buy our coffee, to minimizing our 
environmental footprint, to being involved in local communities.  It’s 
doing things the way we always have.  And it’s using our size for 
good.  And because you support us, Starbucks™ Shared Planet™ is 
what you are a part of too.2 
Whole Foods is another corporation that markets its products and brand as 
better not only for the consumer, but also for the larger community.  From its 
webpage: 
Yes, we are a publicly held company and have to make a profit 
to survive in the marketplace.  But we’ve proven that a company can 
do good and do well if the doing comes from the heart.  Luckily, our 
success helps us bring about change in the marketplace, which we 
hope will lead to good things for you and us and the planet.3 
Corporate philanthropy has a long and distinguished lineage.  Profit-
making firms have often received (or claim to have received) reputational 
benefits from such philanthropic projects as sponsoring World’s Fair exhibits, 
supporting 5K benefit races, or donating to the Ronald McDonald House.  It’s 
easy to be cynical about corporate efforts to sell consumers warm glow along 
with their quarter pounders, coffee, and kumquats.4  Regardless of actual 
 
 1 M. Todd Henderson & Anup Malani, Corporate Philanthropy and the Market for Altruism, 109 
COLUM. L. REV. 571, 583 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).  By contrast, the utility one feels when 
another’s welfare is improved is “pure altruism.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 2 Social Responsibility, STARBUCKS COFFEE CO. CAN., http://www.starbucks.ca/en-ca/_ 
Social Responsibility (last visited May 28, 2011). 
 3 Values & Actions Overview, WHOLE FOODS MKT., http://www.wholefoodsmarket.com/values (last 
visited May 28, 2011). 
 4 Indeed, such efforts might be counterproductive, to the extent that consumers spend money on green 
coffee rather than, for example, donating to an environmental nonprofit that would more directly achieve the 
end the consumer seeks.  James R. Hines Jr. et al., The Attack on Nonprofit Status: A Charitable Assessment, 
108 MICH. L. REV. 1179, 1191 n.54 (2010). 
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motives or benefits, however, what seems undebatable is that more and more 
for-profit corporations are overtly marketing an intangible positive energy as 
part of the products they sell. 
Increased warm-glow marketing from the for-profit sector is part of what is 
blurring its boundary with the nonprofit sector.  But there is more: Nonprofits 
and for-profits now compete in areas formerly occupied almost exclusively by 
nonprofits.  An example involves microfinance—the provision of credit to 
low-income individuals not served by traditional financial institutions.  The 
Grameen Bank, a nonprofit that began in Bangladesh, developed a successful 
microfinance model based on organizing borrowers into groups that take 
collective responsibility for members’ loans.5  The Grameen Bank model 
spawned many nonprofit imitators, but before long, for-profit entities jumped 
on the microfinance bandwagon as well.  Thus Compartamos, which began as 
a nonprofit Grameen-style bank in 1990 but converted to the for-profit form in 
2006, has become one of the largest microfinance institutions in Latin 
America.6  Muhammed Yunus, founder of the Grameen Bank and winner of 
the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize, thinks for-profits cannot be true microcredit 
providers: “When you discuss microcredit, don’t bring Compartamos into 
it. . . .  Microcredit was created to fight the money lender, not to become the 
money lender.”7  For-profit institutions nonetheless argue that their economies 
of scale permit them to make more credit available than nonprofit entities can.  
Citibank8 and Deutsche Bank,9 to name but two international banks, have 
dedicated microfinance divisions. 
Even as the line between for-profits and nonprofits is blurring, debate 
swirls about whether nonprofits should continue to enjoy tax-exempt status.  
For example, the tax-exempt status of nonprofit hospitals has received close 
scrutiny in recent years by Congress and the public, as “nonprofit” hospitals 
have been perceived to be increasingly profitable, perhaps more so than their 
 
 5 See generally About Us, GRAMEEN BANK: BANK FOR THE POOR, http://www.grameen-info.org/index. 
php?option=com_content&task=view&id=792&Itemid=759 (last visited May 28, 2011). 
 6 Keith Epstein & Geri Smith, Compartamos: From Nonprofit to Profit, BUSINESSWEEK, Dec. 24, 2007, 
at 45. 
 7 Online Extra: Yunus Blasts Compartamos, BUSINESSWEEK (Dec. 13, 2007, 5:00 PM), http://www. 
businessweek.com/magazine/content/07_52/b4064045920958.htm. 
 8 Citi Microfinance, CITI, http://www.citibank.com/citi/microfinance (last visited May 28, 2011). 
 9 Microfinance: Effective Self-Help for Entrepreneurs in Developing Countries, DEUTSCHE BANK (Jan. 
31, 2011), http://www.db.com/csr/en/social_investments/microfinance.html. 
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for-profit counterparts.10  A critical Wall Street Journal article observed that at 
least twenty-five nonprofit hospitals or hospital systems have reported earnings 
of over $250 million a year, and one, Ascension Health, reported $1.2 billion 
in net income during the 2007 fiscal year and a staggering $7.4 billion in cash 
and investments—making this nonprofit more profitable than the Walt Disney 
Company.11  Soaring executive compensation has also led to skepticism over 
whether nonprofit hospitals are deserving of tax-exempt status.12  The former 
CEO of Chicago’s Northwestern Memorial Hospital, Gary Mecklenberg, 
received $16.4 million dollars in 2006, while the hospital spent only $20.8 
million—less than 2% of its revenues and only a small fraction of its tax 
breaks—on charity care.13  Northwestern’s annual tax exemptions are 
estimated at over $50 million, not including its tax-exempt capital gains.14  
Accordingly, some argue that the “nonprofit” label is a misnomer that should 
be replaced by “nontaxable.”15 
It is true that nonprofit hospitals, with their lack of access to the capital 
markets, have more reason to stockpile cash than for-profit entities.  And it is 
hard to compare salaries across nonprofit and for-profit hospitals; for example, 
nonprofit salaries may be higher, but incentive compensation tends to be 
lower.16  Still, the perceived increased profitability of nonprofit hospitals, and 
their comparatively minimal expenditures on charity services, has led Congress 
to question nonprofit hospitals’ tax-exempt status and the propriety of 
nonprofit tax exemptions generally: “[M]any goods and services provided by 
tax-exempt organizations are similar, if not identical, to goods and services 
provided by tax-paying entities.  This raises a fairly fundamental question of 
 
 10 See, e.g., John Carreyrou & Barbara Martinez, Nonprofit Hospitals, Once for the Poor, Strike It Rich, 
WALL ST. J., Apr. 4, 2008, at A1 (“Nonprofits, which account for a majority of U.S. hospitals, are faring even 
better than their for-profit counterparts: 77% of the 2,033 U.S. nonprofit hospitals are in the black, while just 
61% of for-profit hospitals are profitable, according to the [American Hospital Directory] data.”). 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id.  Of course, income is manipulable, and comparisons to for-profit hospitals might well be unfair.  
Were the income of nonprofit hospitals subject to taxation, it might be diverted into untaxed areas.  See Jill R. 
Horwitz, Why We Need the Independent Sector: The Behavior, Law, and Ethics of Not-for-Profit Hospitals, 50 
UCLA L. REV. 1345, 1382 n.158 (2003). 
 15 Carreyou & Martinez, supra note 10 (“‘Nonprofit is a misnomer—it’s nontaxable,’ says [Chicago for-
profit] Sacred Heart Hospital’s [President] Novak.  ‘When you’re making hundreds of millions of dollars a 
year, how can you call yourself a not-for-profit?’”). 
 16 Jeffrey P. Ballou & Burton A. Weisbrod, Managerial Rewards and the Behavior of For-Profit, 
Governmental, and Nonprofit Organizations: Evidence from the Hospital Industry, 87 J. PUB. ECON. 1895, 
1903–04 (2003). 
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what makes these organizations unique and, hence, deserving of a tax-exempt 
status.”17  Both the House and the Senate have called for reform of the 
nonprofit sector and have suggested increasing nonprofits’ tax reporting 
requirements.18  In 2007, the minority staff on the Senate Finance Committee 
proposed a requirement that each nonprofit hospital, to be eligible for tax 
exemptions, maintain and promote a charity care program and devote a 
minimum percentage of operating expenses to charity care.19  Some states have 
gone even further, revoking nonprofit tax-exempt status completely.20 
To date the debate over nonprofits—often referred to as tax-exempt 
organizations, a presumed synonym—has largely been a debate about taxation.  
Indeed, even when corporate scholars such as Professors Todd Henderson, 
Anup Malani, and Eric Posner ventured into an examination of nonprofit 
entities, they did so not to analyze their distinct corporate form, but rather to 
question the differential tax treatment between nonprofits and for-profits 
providing the same services.21  Except for the seminal work done decades ago 
by Henry Hansmann,22 corporate governance scholars have largely ceded the 
nonprofit field to tax-law experts.23  And yet, nonprofits are generally 
corporations,24 and as such they should not escape the close attention of 
corporate scholars.  To be sure, nonprofits take an unusual form, and each state 
has a separate nonprofit corporation statute.  Nonetheless, as corporations these 
entities face the same agency-cost dilemma as their for-profit cousins, and their 
distinctive characteristics raise basic questions about their legitimacy and their 
future prospects.25 
 
 17 Overview of the Tax-Exempt Sector: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 109th Cong. 4 
(2005) (statement of Rep. William Marshall Thomas, Chairman, H. Comm. on Ways & Means). 
 18 Jill R. Horwitz, Does Nonprofit Ownership Matter?, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 139, 152 (2007). 
 19 ERIKA LUNDER & EDWARD C. LIU, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34605, TAX-EXEMPT SECTION 
501(C)(3) HOSPITALS: COMMUNITY BENEFIT STANDARD AND SCHEDULE H 6 (2008). 
 20 See Horwitz, supra note 18, at 153 (noting that some states have imposed charity care requirements, or 
threatened to impose charity spending requirements, before a hospital can be tax exempt). 
 21 See, e.g., supra note 1; infra note 25. 
 22 See generally Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835 (1980). 
 23 Notable exceptions include Professors Evelyn Brody, Jill R. Horwitz, Dana Brakman Reiser, John G. 
Simon, and Marion Fremont-Smith. 
 24 Garry W. Jenkins, Incorporation Choice, Uniformity, and the Reform of Nonprofit State Law, 41 GA. 
L. REV. 1113, 1124 (2007).  Nonprofits can also be organized as trusts or cooperatives.  Id.  This Article deals 
primarily with nonprofits taking the corporate form. 
 25 See Henderson & Malani, supra note 1, at 598–600 (arguing that agency costs are lower in for-profit 
charities than in nonprofit ones); Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, The Case for For-Profit Charities, 93 VA. L. 
REV. 2017, 2031–41 (2007) (describing agency problems in both for-profit and nonprofit charities). 
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There is another reason to look at nonprofits as more than vehicles for 
gaming a tax advantage: While all tax-exempt organizations must be 
nonprofits, not all nonprofits are tax-exempt organizations.  The federal tax-
exempt status of nonprofit entities formed under state law is determined by the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) under § 501 of the Internal Revenue Code.26  
The benefit of exempt status is that the organization pays no federal tax on 
income it receives from activities related to its central purpose, and usually no 
state taxes (including property taxes) as well.27  If the nonprofit organization 
further qualifies as a public charity under § 501(c)(3), donations to the 
organization are also tax deductible for the donor.  While we often think of 
nonprofits as coextensive with “public charities,” § 501 lists many 
noncharitable classes of tax-exempt organizations, ranging from civic leagues 
to social and recreational clubs to cemetery companies.28 
While this protected tax status is perhaps the most obvious feature of most 
nonprofit entities, it is not their defining characteristic.  The hallmark of the 
form is the nondistribution constraint: Simply put, what makes a nonprofit a 
nonprofit is the inability to distribute profits.  The nonprofit corporation thus 
has no owners in the for-profit sense of residual claimants entitled to the net 
profits of the firm after creditors have been paid.29  Of course, nonprofits are 
not forbidden to make a profit; indeed, many are highly profitable and some 
have assets worth billions of dollars.30  Use of the nonprofit form does not 
prohibit profit making; rather it prohibits the distribution of profits qua profits 
to shareholders, members, or others. 
Given the increased blurring of lines between for-profit and nonprofit 
warm-glow purveyors, one might wonder whether room is left in the modern 
 
 26 Charities generally fall under § 501(c)(3) of the Code, but § 501(c) lists twenty-eight categories of tax-
exempt organizations.  I.R.C. § 501(c) (2006). 
 27 So if Company A (a for-profit) and Company B (a nonprofit) each have income of $100,000, Company 
A will pay a corporate tax rate of 34%, leaving it with $66,000 in net income.  Company B will pay no federal 
taxes and generally no state taxes, and thus will have $100,000 in net income.  It will also avoid state property 
taxes. 
 28 See I.R.C. § 501(c)(4), (7), (13) (providing that civic leagues, recreational clubs, and cemetery 
companies, respectively, can be nonprofits). 
 29 Kevin E. Davis, The Role of Nonprofits in the Production of Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1075, 
1089 (2006). 
 30 Princeton’s endowment was valued at $12.6 billion on June 30, 2009 (down from $16.3 billion a year 
earlier).  John Hechinger, Princeton’s Endowment Declines 23%, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 2009, at C3.  
Harvard’s endowment stood at $26 billion on June 30, 2009 ($36.9 billion a year earlier), and Yale’s was at 
$16 billion (from $22.9 billion a year earlier).  John Hechinger, Harvard, Yale Are Big Losers in ‘The Game’ 
of Investing, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 2009, at A1. 
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day for the nonprofit form.  Borrowing from the psychological concept of 
social identity, this Article argues that the nonprofit form itself permits the 
creation of a special kind of warm-glow good—one based on a shared identity.  
While countless for-profits are in the business of selling consumers identity, 
this Article posits that nonprofits create a different kind of identity, one that 
provides a distinctive warm glow that ordinary corporations cannot offer for 
the very reason that they are for-profit firms.  A for-profit entity that proposes 
to save the dolphins or feed the hungry is incoherent because the knowledge 
that the firm’s owner is ultimately in business to make money will dim the 
self-same warm glow that a donor seeks in giving to the organization in the 
first place. 
The Article proceeds as follows.  Part I describes the landscape of 
nonprofits and articulates the “nonprofit puzzle”: Corporate governance theory 
suggests that agency costs should run rampant in nonprofits, but if that is the 
case, why do people continue to participate in them?  Part II surveys existing 
theories of the firm and the nonprofit, and argues that none of these theories 
adequately explains the existence of the form.  Part III draws on work in the 
field of psychology to elaborate a social identity theory of the nonprofit. 
Building on the important fact that modern nonprofits are a heterogeneous 
group, Part IV analyzes different categories of nonprofits, using examples to 
identify cases in which the identity function is (and is not) most salient.  In 
particular, it suggests that there are reasons to accord differing tax treatment to 
for-profit and nonprofit entities, while also raising the prospect that tax-exempt 
status should be limited only to those nonprofits that focus on providing warm 
glow. 
Ascribing special meaning to the nonprofit form of business organization 
offers analytical and practical payoffs, which are the subject of Part V.  First, 
social identity theory solves the nonprofit puzzle described in Part I by 
articulating controls on agency costs in the nonprofit form.  Second, a focus on 
social identity theory casts new light on proper tax policy, suggesting three 
contradictory results: 
• If society wants to encourage the production of more 
warm glow via tax policy, it should favor granting tax-
exempt status to entities that provide social identity. 
• If society, on the other hand, wants to use tax policy to 
achieve certain social goals as efficiently as possible, 
RODRIGUES GALLEYSFINAL 6/29/2011  11:42 AM 
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then it might exempt from taxation only those entities 
providing a socially desirable service that do not 
provide social identity, on the theory that social 
identity organizations will flourish even without 
socially expensive tax exemption.  Under this view tax 
exemption is reserved for those for-profit entities that 
could not survive without it, while for nonprofits 
working in the same space, social identity is its own 
reward. 
• Finally, social identity theory could help to justify tax 
equality for for-profits and nonprofits.  In particular, a 
social identity theory of the nonprofit suggests that, 
even if taxed on an equal basis with for-profits, some 
nonprofits would continue to flourish because the 
nonprofit form creates something that for-profits doing 
the same work simply cannot. 
Two more implications from the social identity theory transcend the realm 
of tax policy.  First, in 2008 the Vermont legislature created the low-profit 
limited liability company (L3C), and other states have considered following 
suit.31  Scholars are just beginning to evaluate this nascent form of business 
organization, and any proper assessment must take into account the role 
purveying warm glow has in the nonprofit form.  Finally, the social identity 
function offers a new understanding of the differences between for-profit and 
nonprofit corporations with respect to campaign finance regulation.  As 
lawmakers and judges continue to grapple with campaign finance reform, they 
should be careful to consider the difference between nonprofit corporations 
that focus on creating warm glow and those that do not.  An identity-based 
understanding of the nonprofit offers an alternative path to the approaches 
taken by both the majority and the dissenters in Citizens United.32 
I. THE NONPROFIT PUZZLE 
The nonprofit sector is a substantial part of the overall U.S. economy.  Over 
1.4 million nonprofit organizations and groups are registered with the Internal 
 
 31 Carter G. Bishop, The Low-Profit LLC (L3C): Program Related Investment by Proxy or Perversion?, 
63 ARK. L. REV. 243, 246–47 & nn.2–3 (2010). 
 32 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
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Revenue Service.33  Of those registered entities, just over one-third are 
required to report more detailed information to the IRS;34 this smaller subset of 
all nonprofits has nearly $3.0 trillion in assets.35  These entities make a 
dramatic contribution to the domestic economy.  Estimates for the percentage 
of gross domestic product (GDP) attributable to the nonprofit sector range from 
over 7%36 to between 11% and 12%.37  Employing nearly 10% of all workers 
(just under 13 million people),38 nonprofits pay nearly 8.3% of all salaries and 
wages earned in the country.39  These entities provide and operate churches, 
museums, and vast grant-making programs.40  In short, nonprofits permeate 
American life. 
For many observers, this picture raises an important set of questions: In a 
world where for-profits now provide the same products as nonprofits, why do 
nonprofits continue to thrive?  Should they continue to thrive?  And, in 
particular, should they continue to enjoy the preferential tax treatment that 
provides an incentive for the use of the nonprofit form?  In fact, for-profit 
institutions have entered traditionally nonprofit realms, such as education and 
health care, and compete side by side with nonprofits in emerging areas such 
as microfinance and the sale of carbon offsets.  This convergence has led 
critics to question the usefulness of the nonprofit form.41  This Part explores 
 
 33 KENNARD T. WING ET AL., THE NONPROFIT ALMANAC 2008, at 3 tbl.1.1 (2008) (summarizing 
nonprofit statistics on tax-exempt organizations by Internal Revenue Code section classification). 
 34 URBAN INST., THE NONPROFIT SECTOR IN BRIEF: FACTS AND FIGURES FROM THE NONPROFIT ALMANAC 
2007, at 2 (2006), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/311373_nonprofit_sector.pdf (observing 
that nonprofits that collect over $25,000 in gross receipts are required to file a Form 990 annually with the 
IRS).  Firms must disclose, for example, information on their board members and the members’ 
interrelationships, descriptions of programs, financial information, and tax compliance information.  See Julie 
L. Floch & Sean B. Delany, Mastering the New Form 990, in ADVISING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 2010, at 
91, 95–96 (PLI Tax Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. J-905, 2010). 
 35 URBAN INST., supra note 34, at 3 tbl.2 (noting total assets of all IRS-registered-and-reporting 
nonprofits). 
 36 Id. at 1; see also Report Quantifies GDP Contributions of Civil Society Sector, NONPROFIT BUS. 
ADVISOR, Dec. 2007, at 11, 11 (“[T]he civil society sector . . . accounts, on average, for 5 percent of the GDP 
in the countries covered and exceeds 7 percent in some countries, such as Canada and the United States.”). 
 37 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-1084T, NONPROFIT SECTOR: INCREASING NUMBERS 
AND KEY ROLE IN DELIVERING FEDERAL SERVICES 4 (2007). 
 38 INDEP. SECTOR, NONPROFIT ALMANAC: FACTS AND FINDINGS: EMPLOYMENT IN THE NONPROFIT 
SECTOR 1 (n.d.), http://www.austincc.edu/npo/library/documents/NPOemploymentnatl.pdf (“Nonprofit 
employment represents 9.5 percent of total employment in the United States, with total employees numbering 
12.5 million.”). 
 39 URBAN INST., supra note 34, at 1. 
 40 Id. at 3–5 (listing broad categories of nonprofit organizations). 
 41 See, e.g., Henderson & Malani, supra note 1; Malani & Posner, supra note 25. 
RODRIGUES GALLEYSFINAL 6/29/2011  11:42 AM 
2011] ENTITY AND IDENTITY 1267 
the defining characteristics of the nonprofit and flaws in the form that have 
provoked criticism. 
A. The Peculiar Problem of Agency Costs for the Nonprofit 
Modern skepticism about nonprofit entities begins with the issue of agency 
costs.  Such costs are a concern for all firms, but special problems arise for 
nonprofits because they do not have shareholders whose profit motive 
naturally drives them to monitor the actions of managers.  At bottom, the 
“nonprofit puzzle” is this: Why do nonprofits exist at all, given the pervasive 
risk of agency costs and the dramatically limited means to address them that 
the nonprofit form provides? 
Agency costs exist whenever a principal entrusts power to an agent to act 
on her behalf.  The agent may rent-seek, absorbing profit that should rightly 
devolve to her principal.  She may shirk her duty or slack off.  Or she may seek 
to fulfill her job in good faith, but make choices that her principal would not 
want her to make.  It is hard for the principal to disentangle which losses are 
attributable to self-interested rent-seeking as opposed to factors outside the 
agent’s control.  Monitoring can reduce agency costs, but monitoring is 
costly.42 
For-profit firms take a variety of approaches to constrain agency costs.  A 
firm with a small number of owner-managers is akin to a parcel of real estate 
occupied by a few fee-simple holders (as opposed, for example, to rental 
property).  In each case the owners have an incentive to reduce costs and make 
long-term investments in the property, and have the control and access to make 
necessary changes.  In other words, such owners face few agency costs, and 
this fact has important practical consequences.  For example, owners of 
partnerships and LLCs can—and often do—contractually constrain agency 
costs by forcing managers to distribute earnings, leaving them with less 
residual money to squander.43 
Among for-profit forms, then, we might expect agency costs to be highest 
in large public corporations, where disparate “owners” exercise no direct 
monitoring.  Indeed, in the 1980s Michael Jensen went so far as to pronounce 
that “the publicly held corporation . . . has outlived its usefulness in many 
 
 42 Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs 
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310 (1976). 
 43 Larry E. Ribstein, Partnership Governance of Large Firms, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 289, 291 (2009). 
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sectors of the economy” and predicted that public stock offerings would be 
increasingly displaced by capital acquisition via the incurring of public and 
private debt.44  However, corporate law addresses agency-cost dangers by 
giving shareholders the rights to vote for directors, sell their shares, and sue 
managers on the corporation’s behalf.45  The market for corporate control 
further disciplines public corporations: If managers do a poor job, a depressed 
stock price puts the corporation at risk for a takeover that will likely cost 
managers their jobs. 
By ensuring that there are no owners clamoring for a share of profits—and 
therefore motivated to police the agents—the nonprofit model arguably leads 
to much greater agency costs than the for-profit model.  To unpack these 
agency costs, we can characterize a would-be donor as a principal.  The 
nonprofit managers are her agents.  If she were to give to a for-profit firm, the 
donor would worry that a portion of each dollar she gave would go straight to 
the firm’s owners as profits.  The nondistribution constraint inherent in 
nonprofits reduces that possibility, but does so in an imperfect way because 
donated funds can be diverted to managers through inflated compensation 
payments and other more subtle means.46 
The basic difficulty is that the absence of owners means that nonprofits 
lack individuals within the organizational form who are incentivized to police 
agency costs.  A nonprofit’s participants47 generally lack their for-profit 
counterparts’ powers to vote, sell, or sue.  While membership organizations—
such as Wikimedia—do allow members to vote for the board,48 donors to 
charitable organizations generally do not have the right to vote for directors.  
Since nonprofits do not generally distribute shares, and certainly do not trade 
on a public exchange, there is no market for control.  And due to standing 
 
 44 George S. Geis, The Space Between Markets and Hierarchies, 95 VA. L. REV. 99, 113 (2009) 
(alteration in original) (quoting Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARV. BUS. REV., 
Sept.–Oct. 1989, at 61, 61) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 45 See generally Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 407 
(2006) (describing the basic rights of shareholders in corporate entities). 
 46 If the founders (and natural owners) of the firm are also its managers, as is often the case, then the 
nondistribution constraint does nothing to prevent disguised profit distributions in the form of inflated salary 
and perquisites.  This rent-seeking functionally equates to normal managerial rent-seeking, however, and so is 
part of that discussion. 
 47 This Article uses the term participants to refer to both donors to charitable organizations and members 
in membership organizations. 
 48 See infra Part IV.B.2. 
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problems, participants cannot even employ the weak mechanism of derivative 
lawsuits to protect their investments.49 
All that protects nonprofit participants from agency costs is the 
nondistribution constraint—a constraint that is easily avoided and weakly 
enforced.  While a nonprofit may not pay out profits qua profits, it can make 
disguised payouts in the form of 
excessive salaries, low-interest loans from the organization, personal 
services and amenities paid for out of the organization’s funds, 
excessively generous contracts for services provided to the 
organization by businesses owned by the managers, or the purchase 
or lease of real estate by the organization from its managers at 
inflated prices, mortgage interest, or rents.50 
Indeed, critics of nonprofit hospitals cite large salaries and perquisites, such as 
retreats at luxury hotels, as examples of spending inappropriate for a charity.51 
Regulatory review of nonprofits is largely nonexistent.  While it is true that 
the IRS evaluates nonprofits initially to determine if they qualify for exempt-
organization status52 and recently gained the power to impose sanctions on 
nonprofits that award their executives excessive compensation,53 it rarely 
invokes this power.54  Under the laws of most states, only the attorney general, 
rather than organization members or donors, may sue for improper use of 
funds.55  But state attorneys general do not conduct regular reviews of 
 
 49 See Jonathan Klick & Robert H. Sitkoff, Agency Costs, Charitable Trusts, and Corporate Control: 
Evidence from Hershey’s Kiss-Off, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 787–88 (2008) (noting the weakness of 
shareholder litigation as a mechanism for reducing agency costs in the corporate context). 
 50 Hansmann, supra note 22, at 875; see also BURTON A. WEISBROD, THE NONPROFIT ECONOMY 11 
(1988) (“Nonprofits can act as for-profits in disguise by evading the constraint on distribution of profits by 
dispensing profits in the form of increased wages.”).  Nonprofit directors and managers who work for or own 
for-profit firms can also extract rents by funneling services to those for-profit firms at beneficial rates.  See id. 
at 12. 
 51 Northwestern Memorial Hospital paid its former CEO $16.4 million, consisting mainly of deferred 
compensation and retirement benefits, in 2006.  Carreyrou & Martinez, supra note 10; Jacob Goldstein, On 
Top of Tax Breaks, Nonprofit Hospitals Reap Big Profits, WALL ST. J. HEALTH BLOG (Apr. 4, 2008, 8:29 AM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/health/2008/04/04/on-top-of-tax-breaks-nonprofit-hospitals-reap-big-profits. 
 52 See Application for Recognition of Exemption, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., http://www.irs.gov/ 
charities/article/0,,id=96109,00.html (last updated Nov. 10, 2010) (explaining the application process and 
disclosure requirements that must be satisfied before the IRS will recognize exempt status). 
 53 Malani & Posner, supra note 25, at 2038 n.39 (“Although intermediate sanctions were adopted in 
1996, the IRS did not win its first case until 2002, and promptly lost that case on appeal.” (citations omitted)). 
 54 Id. at 2038. 
 55 Hansmann, supra note 22, at 873. 
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nonprofits and only occasionally launch investigations.56  Worse yet, such 
investigations may well occur only if they are politically expedient.57 
To be sure, the boards of nonprofits can and often do check abuses by their 
day-to-day managers.  Many board members, however, have little reason to 
engage in serious policing, especially if they are not major financial supporters 
of the organization.  And when large donors do serve as directors, they may 
not be representative of the majority of donors, and thus not focused on 
vindicating more general donor interests.58  Indeed, some high-profile donors 
have resorted to extralegal mechanisms to ensure that their gifts are spent as 
intended.  Warren Buffett, for example, conditioned his staged donation of 
over $1 billion per year to the Gates Foundation on the continued active 
involvement of Bill or Melinda Gates in the organization.59  He also required 
that the total value of the previous year’s gift be spent before another gift could 
be made, to ensure that he could monitor the use of his donations.60  John M. 
Olin, seeking to avoid the liberal drift of the Ford Foundation during the 1960s 
and 1970s, required that all resources of the Olin Foundation be spent within 
one generation of his death.61  These sorts of arrangements, however, are the 
exception rather than the rule.  Most donors to charitable corporations have 
 
 56 See id. at 873–74 (“[I]n most states neither the office of the attorney general nor any other office of the 
state government devotes any appreciable amount of resources to the oversight of nonprofit firms.”); Horwitz, 
supra note 14, at 1385 (“Few attorneys general, the only authorities with oversight powers, have adequate 
resources to or interest in overseeing not-for-profits.”). 
 57 See Klick & Sitkoff, supra note 49, at 781 (“The state attorney general, however, is a political official, 
typically elected, with neither a personal financial stake nor, in the usual case, a political stake in the operation 
of a charitable trust.  Most state attorneys general assign few (if any) lawyers to supervision of charities.  
Unless an alleged breach of trust obtains enough media attention to achieve political salience, actual scrutiny 
of a charitable trust by the attorney general is unlikely.  As a result, it is the politically salient, egregious cases 
that ‘trigger investigations,’ not ‘reviews of annual reports.’  In the usual case there simply is not enough of a 
political payoff to the attorney general to warrant the diversion of resources from other initiatives.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
 58 George G. Triantis, Organizations as Internal Capital Markets: The Legal Boundaries of Firms, 
Collateral, and Trusts in Commercial and Charitable Enterprises, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1102, 1148 (2004).  
Membership organizations have more voice in governance, but the other two rights given to corporate 
shareholders—the power to sell or sue if they are unhappy with the organization’s management—are denied to 
them. 
 59 Carol J. Loomis, Warren Buffett Gives It Away, FORTUNE, July 10, 2006, at 56, 58. 
 60 Implementing Warren Buffett’s Gift, BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUND., http://www.gatesfoundation. 
org/about/Pages/implementing-warren-buffetts-gift.aspx (last visited May 28, 2011). 
 61 Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical 
Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 277 n.523 (2003). 
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little power to ensure even that specially designated funds are spent according 
to their wishes.62 
B. Why Nonprofits? 
Given the high agency-cost risks associated with nonprofits and the weak 
countervailing constraints, why do individuals continue to donate time and 
money to them?  Many scholars have argued that such donations are in fact ill-
advised.  Jonathan Klick and Robert H. Sitkoff describe “[t]he prevailing 
scholarly view . . . that agency costs are rampant in charitable trust 
governance.”63  And all the agency-cost dangers of the charitable trust form 
apply equally to noncharitable nonprofits because both settings suffer from an 
absence of owners, weak state-law enforcement mechanisms, and lack of 
participant standing to sue.  So why does anyone participate in any nonprofit 
venture? 
Tax-exempt status is a tempting response.  The advantages of being a tax-
exempt organization are indeed considerable, particularly for a 501(c)(3) 
organization, which offers the special benefit of tax-deductible donations.64  
But the existing tax-exempt status merely raises another question: Why should 
tax-exempt status be afforded to some, but not other, business organizations—
especially to those organizations most susceptible to agency costs?  
Complaints about special tax treatment have the greatest resonance among 
those who view nonprofits as merely “for-profits in disguise.”65  According to 
 
 62 Of course, even lacking standing, donors may alert others to the problem.  Hines et al., supra note 4, at 
1206 (“[Donors can] tip off the attorney general, the local press, or the beneficiary of the gift-over.”). 
 63 Klick & Sitkoff, supra note 49, at 782. 
 64 To achieve tax-exempt status, first a corporation must incorporate within one of the fifty states or the 
District of Columbia under a state’s nonprofit statute.  Then it must file a Form 1023 with the federal 
government, along with an accompanying application for state income tax.  Once conferred, 501(c)(3) tax-
exempt status allows donors to deduct donations from their federal taxes and state property taxes, and also 
excuses the donee corporation from paying taxes on any profits (except for unrelated business income).  
Mutual benefit organizations, such as neighborhood pools, sororities, and trade associations, enjoy tax-exempt 
organization status, although members’ dues are not tax-deductible contributions.  See generally Peter K. 
Shack, The Law and Ethics of Fundraising Regulation, in NOT-FOR-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: THE CHALLENGE 
OF GOVERNANCE IN AN ERA OF RETRENCHMENT 295 (Am. Law Inst.-Am. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Continuing 
Prof’l Educ., Course of Study Ser. C726, 1992); Joanne Fritz, Nonprofit Incorporation—An Overview, 
ABOUT.COM, http://nonprofit.about.com/od/nonprofitbasics/a/incorporating.htm (last visited May 28, 2011). 
 65 WEISBROD, supra note 50, at 11.  Indeed, one theory postulates that much of the nonprofit sector may 
be made up of these so-called for-profits in disguise.  Id.  “Acting like profit-maximizing firms, these 
nonprofits are of dubious legality.  They exist only because incomplete enforcement of the constraint against 
distribution of profit permits them to abuse their nonprofit status.”  Id.  The problem under this view is 
essentially one of misclassification: the government has mistakenly given beneficial tax treatment to firms that 
actually work for the profit of the managers and directors.  Id. 
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this theory, nonprofits’ tax-exempt status distorts the market, favoring less 
efficient nonprofit warm-glow providers at the expense of their would-be for-
profit competitors. 
Malani and Posner have built on this critique.  They advocate leveling the 
playing field by exempting for-profit firms from taxation to the extent that they 
undertake charitable activities.66  Their argument is that the for-profit firm 
structure creates a powerful incentive for lowering administrative costs, an 
incentive absent in the nonprofit form.67  Thus, the for-profit charity may be a 
more efficient provider of charitable services68 and, accordingly, a more 
attractive purveyor of warm glow.  Taxing them equally—that is, not taxing 
income from charitable services performed by for-profits, and allowing tax 
deductions on donations to for-profit charities—would allow for-profits to 
compete on a level playing field. 
Malani and Posner make contestable presumptions about efficiency that 
other scholars have successfully attacked,69 but taken on its face, their thesis 
leaves little space for nonprofits to exist at all.  If for-profits provide the same 
benefits with greater efficiency, the next step after leveling the tax treatment 
might be to do away with the nonprofit form entirely (or at least allow it to 
wither into irrelevancy as donors naturally gravitate toward newly tax-
advantaged for-profit warm-glow providers).  Does the nonprofit form confer 
anything other than tax-exempt status?  This Article suggests that an 
organization’s form—the nonprofit form in particular, but perhaps other forms, 
as well—can create something valuable in and of itself: a special identity that 
the for-profit firm simply cannot provide.  Before turning to this argument in 
Parts III and IV, Part II assesses other previously articulated theories advanced 
in support of the nonprofit form. 
 
 66 Malani & Posner, supra note 25, at 2023. 
 67 Id. at 2028–29 & tbl.2. 
 68 See id. 
 69 Several scholars have criticized the details of the Malani–Posner proposal, questioning its basic 
assumptions and the validity of the model.  See, e.g., Victor Fleischer, Response, “For Profit Charity”: Not 
Quite Ready for Prime Time, 93 VA. L. REV. BRIEF 231, 232 (2008), http://www.virginialawreview.org/ 
inbrief/2008/01/21/fleischer.pdf (“Posner and Malani may place too much faith in the ability of Section 
501(c)(3) to distinguish between charitable and noncharitable activities.”); Brian Galle, Keep Charity 
Charitable, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1213, 1214–15 (2010) (“By opening philanthropy to potential profiteering, 
Malani, Posner, and their allies would dilute the power of these perceptions for every firm . . . .”); Hines et al., 
supra note 4, at 1183 (“[Malani and Posner’s] policy recommendation . . . is considerably less sound than the 
current regime of restricting tax benefits to organizations with nonprofit status.”). 
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II. THEORIES OF NONPROFITS 
A. Theories of the Firm (in a Nutshell) 
In neoclassical economics, market transactions are presumed to be the most 
efficient, and the existence of firms is therefore perplexing.  There are both 
economic and legal “theories of the firm”—explanations for why firms exist at 
all.  Economic theories look at how firms minimize transaction costs, while 
legal theories focus on the function of the legal boundary of the firm.70  Neither 
provides a satisfying explanation for the existence of nonprofits. 
Ronald Coase’s seminal article, The Nature of the Firm, posited that firms 
exist because at a certain point, despite the cheapness of individual “spot” 
market transactions, the costs associated with those transactions make it more 
efficient to produce rather than buy certain products.71  Uncertainty, the need 
for long-term commitments, and external forces such as taxes all encourage the 
formation of a firm, which can shelter transactions from the costs imposed by 
the marketplace.72  Oliver Williamson’s work elaborated on Coase’s original 
insight by detailing three sorts of transaction costs that the creation of a firm 
tends to reduce: search and information costs, negotiation costs, and policing 
and enforcement costs.73  The Coase–Williamson transaction cost story, then, 
explains the existence of firms generally, but not the existence of nonprofits. 
The dominant metaphor for the corporation is the “nexus of contracts”: The 
firm in this view serves a coordinating function among managers, 
shareholders, suppliers, and consumers.74  Replacing the old models of 
“corporation as person” or as “license from the state,” the nexus of contracts 
model emphasizes that firms are a form of private ordering.  Like Coase’s 
theory of the firm, however, the nexus of contracts approach fails to explain 
 
 70 Agency-cost theories do not explain the firm, but conceptualize the relationship between manager and 
investor. 
 71 R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 388–92 (1937). 
 72 See id. at 393. 
 73 See generally Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual 
Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233 (1979) (arguing that transaction costs are central to the field of economics).  In 
a perfect world, for present purposes defined as one free from transaction costs, “spot” market transactions 
would always dominate, and there would be no need for internal production of products.  But we live in an 
imperfect world where transaction costs exist, and internal production therefore can be more efficient.  Coase, 
supra note 71, at 391. 
 74 Michael Klausner, The Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A Generation Later, 31 J. CORP. L. 
779, 779–80 (2006); Brett H. McDonnell, Professor Bainbridge and the Arrowian Moment: A Review of The 
New Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 139, 153 (2009) (book review). 
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why firms exist in the forms that they do, other than to posit that the law 
provides certain default forms that private parties are (or should be) free to 
modify as they choose.  Presumably some contracting parties favor a 
“corporate” style nexus, while others favor a “nonprofit” nexus.  According to 
this view, firm forms are only conveniences—default contracts that parties can 
vary as they see fit.  The theory does not address why the existing defaults 
exist, that is, why some contracting parties may be drawn to the nonprofit 
form. 
Responding to the nexus of contracts literature, asset-based theories of the 
firm suggest that the firm is perhaps more than a nexus of contracts, because 
organizational forms provide something parties cannot obtain through contract 
alone.  Hansmann and Kraakman identify asset partitioning as the essential 
role of organizational law.75  Most obviously, shareholders cannot effectively 
contract for limited liability from the debts of the organization.76  More 
profoundly, in their view, it is impossible for shareholders to contract away 
firm-level liability for the debts of other shareholders.77  Only the corporate 
form can successfully shield firm assets from the reach of shareholders’ 
creditors.78 
Margaret Blair and George Triantis have also put forward asset-based 
theories of the firm.  Blair argues that the corporate form permits a lock-in of 
capital that is absent in the partnership form.79  Triantis argues that a firm’s 
legal boundaries separate internal capital markets, within which a firm’s 
managers can easily redeploy resources merely by deciding to do so, from 
external capital markets, where resources can only be moved by means of 
contracting.80  For example, the managers of a candy corporation can easily 
decide to use the revenue from its lollipop factory to fund the expansion of its 
chocolate business.  But if the corporation is divided into parent chocolate and 
subsidiary lollipop corporations, the managers’ discretion in reallocating 
 
 75 See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 
387, 390 (2000). 
 76 Indeed, some organizational forms, like the general partnership, do not permit this form of what the 
authors term “defensive asset partitioning.”  Id. at 395–96. 
 77 Id. at 394. 
 78 George Triantis’s works, both alone and with Edward Iacobucci, explore how the need for legal 
partitioning drives how firms distribute firm assets amongst subsidiaries.  See Edward M. Iacobucci & George 
G. Triantis, Economic and Legal Boundaries of Firms, 93 VA. L. REV. 515 (2007); Triantis, supra note 58. 
 79 Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business Organizers in the 
Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387, 389–90 (2003). 
 80 Triantis, supra note 58, at 1105. 
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resources between the parent and subsidiary is constrained by legal obligations 
that do not exist within a single firm.81  While asset-based theories cast fresh 
light on the existence of the corporate form, they do not explain the need for 
the nonprofit corporation. 
B. Theories of the Firm as Applied to Nonprofits 
These theories of the firm can be applied to nonprofits, but ultimately they 
do not explain the need for a separate nonprofit form.  For example, while 
prospective donors and volunteers can in some sense “buy” warm glow82 on 
the spot market, the scope of personal transactions is inherently limited.83  
Animal lovers, for example, can feed stray dogs or adopt them.  If interested in 
more systemic solutions, they can pay to spay or neuter individual dogs they 
encounter.  Most of them, however, will donate to the Society for the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (SPCA).  The attractions of the latter option 
are reduced transaction costs: information costs, search costs, etc.  The Coase–
Williamson theory of the firm takes us this far, but does not explain why a 
special nonprofit form of organization (as opposed to the ordinary for-profit 
form) should be available to providers of these services.84  It merely explains 
the gains that agglomeration offers, which boil down to economies of scale and 
coordination.  As Malani and Posner argue, for-profit firms offer these 
benefits, with lower administrative costs to boot.85 
Asset-partitioning theories also fail to explain the existence of nonprofits.  
Hansmann and Kraakman’s asset-partitioning view of the firm explains why 
the corporate form exists, and also why limited liability forms (both companies 
and partnerships) exist: to protect creditors of the firm by shielding them from 
the debts of investors and, in some cases, to shield investors from the entity’s 
debts.86  Nonprofits generally take the corporate form, and thus shelter their 
creditors from the nonprofit participants’ debts.  The lack of ownership interest 
in the nonprofit presumably protects participants from the organization’s 
 
 81 Cf. id. at 1125–26 (“[There is a] difference in legal obligations between two projects that are managed 
within a single firm and two projects that lie in distinct but affiliated corporations subject to common 
control . . . .”). 
 82 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 83 Nonprofit employees and members of nonprofit associations can find no substitute for the firm on the 
spot market. 
 84 See Malani & Posner, supra note 25. 
 85 Id. at 2022. 
 86 Hansman & Kraakman, supra note 75, at 390. 
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debts—but nonprofits are generally corporations, and therefore already offer 
this protection to their participants. 
Triantis characterizes donors’ restricted gifts as a type of asset partitioning, 
a way to ensure that dedicated assets are not diverted for an unintended 
purpose.87  He relies on trust principles for their enforcement: “If a donor 
restricts the use of her contribution to a specific purpose, the charity may not 
reallocate the funds to a different purpose.  Moreover, the charity cannot 
borrow against assets acquired with restricted funds in order to finance a 
different project.”88  Problematically, however, donors must generally rely on 
attorneys general to enforce trust principles,89 and they, as we have discussed, 
are poor policers of nonprofits.90  More generally, Triantis uses asset 
partitioning as a way to explain the treatment of restricted gifts within 
charities; it does not explain the existence of the nonprofit form itself.  In sum, 
asset partitioning may explain some donor behavior but cannot explain what 
sets the nonprofit form apart. 
C. Contract Failure 
Henry Hansmann offers by far the most complete theoretical account of the 
nonprofit form, which he argues exists because of contract failure.91  His 
elegant theory accounts for many of the different types of nonprofits.  Take, for 
example, a classic charity.  A donor may want to help the poor in Africa.  A 
for-profit entity might do as well (or better) at delivering the service—aid to 
the African poor—as a nonprofit.92  But the donor would worry that, because 
the corporation’s shareholders will clamor for the distribution of profits, the 
organization would skimp on the promised services in order to give the owners 
 
 87 Triantis, supra note 58, at 1153–54. 
 88 Id. at 1150. 
 89 See id. at 1152. 
 90 See supra notes 55–57 and accompanying text.  Yet a growing number of descendants are suing to 
enforce the provisions of their progenitors’ bequests.  Two suits involved Brandeis University’s alleged failure 
to honor donor bequests.  In one, the University planned to demolish a science building named after a 
benefactor that had left a substantial sum “for a building, or a portion of a building, to be known as the ‘Julius 
Kalman Memorial,’” and replace it with a building named after a new donor.  Tracy Jan, Brandeis Settles Suit 
over Name of New Science Building, BOS. GLOBE, Aug. 20, 2009, http://www.boston.com/news/local/ 
breaking_news/2009/08/brandeis_settle.html; see also John Hechinger, Brandeis Settles Donor Lawsuit over 
Science Building, WALL ST. J., Aug. 19, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125071093826043923.html.  
Overseers of the Rose Museum, including a descendent of the original donors, filed a similar suit against 
Brandeis over the closing of that museum.  See Randy Kennedy, Lawsuit Seeks to Save Art Museum at 
Brandeis, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2009, at C2. 
 91 See Hansmann, supra note 22, at 843–45. 
 92 See Henderson & Malani, supra note 1. 
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a higher return.  The problem arises from the inability of the donor and the 
intended recipients (the African poor) to contract directly.93  There is no way 
for the beneficiary to complain to the donor directly about the quality of the 
service being provided.  Given this contract failure, the nondistribution 
constraint creates a more trustworthy intermediary because, by law, a nonprofit 
cannot distribute any excess it might divert from the poor. 
According to Hansmann, nursing homes and daycare facilities are often 
nonprofits for related reasons.  Firms providing complex private services pose 
difficulties for purchasers seeking to evaluate the quality of the service being 
provided: The children and elderly receiving care might not be able to report 
service skimping to the parents or adult children paying for the service and are 
often powerless to demand better care.94  As delivery of these services through 
a nonprofit minimizes the danger of service skimping in the first instance, 
individuals are more willing to entrust the care of a loved one to a nonprofit 
service provider.95  The logical corollary of this theory is that nonprofit service 
providers would highlight their nonprofit status to consumers as a signal of 
quality. 
There is, however, a problem for Hansmann’s theory: A clever empirical 
study by Anup Malani and Guy David found little evidence that nonprofits 
actually emphasize their nonprofit status.96  According to Malani and David, if 
contract failure were the true motive for nonprofit formation, nonprofits would 
signal their status in advertising, effectively telling the market: “You can trust 
us more, we’re nonprofits.”97  Yet their study of yellow page advertisements 
and websites revealed that “less than 7.5 percent of nonprofit firms signal their 
status in yellow pages advertisements, only 25 percent do so on their home 
pages, and 30 percent do so on their about-us pages.  Indeed, over 35 percent 
never signal their nonprofit status [on their websites].”98 
This Article later argues that the Malani–David study was flawed because it 
focused only on service providers: hospitals and daycare providers.99  Even so, 
 
 93 See Hansmann, supra note 22, at 862–63. 
 94 See id. at 863–65.  Hansmann observes that there is less informational asymmetry in these areas now 
than formerly, and that historical lag likely accounts for continued nonprofit presence in these areas.  HENRY 
HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 236–37 (1996). 
 95 See Hansmann, supra note 22, at 863–65. 
 96 Anup Malani & Guy David, Does Nonprofit Status Signal Quality?, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 551, 555 
(2008). 
 97 Id. at 554–55. 
 98 Id. at 555. 
 99 See infra Part IV.A. 
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Malani and David’s work makes a valuable contribution.  It suggests that, even 
if contract failure may have sufficiently explained the nonprofit status of 
hospitals and daycare providers in the past, it no longer does so.  Instead, these 
organizations compete largely on the strength of the services provided: their 
scope, their reliability, their facilities, and their comparisons with other 
providers in the market.  The Malani–David study by design does not address 
contract failure in markets where nonprofits and for-profits do not compete on 
the provision of services. 
Hansmann also applied the contract failure analysis to public goods such as 
a “listener-sponsored radio station”100—what we will term public radio.101  
Hansmann conducts a thought experiment, “silly” as it might seem, imagining 
a for-profit listener-sponsored radio station.102  The problem, he argues, is not 
that the public nature of the good—commercial-free radio—creates a free-rider 
problem103 (although it does).  He asserts that people are often willing to pay 
for free riders.104  The problem with for-profit radio stations is that they would 
have an incentive to solicit donations far in excess of what is needed to pay for 
broadcast and to distribute the excess as profits to the owners.  The contract 
failure here is not that the donor doesn’t know the quality of the service being 
provided (as with the African poor in the earlier example), but rather that she 
does not know whether, or how much of, her contribution is paying for the 
service.  Nonprofit status provides at least some assurance that profits are not 
being diverted to the owners’ pockets.105 
 
 100 Hansmann, supra note 22, at 550. 
 101 A note about structure: National Public Radio (NPR) is a private, nonprofit membership organization 
that partners with separately licensed and operated public radio stations (member stations) “to create a more 
informed public—one challenged and invigorated by a deeper understanding and appreciation of events, ideas 
and cultures.”  About NPR: Mission and Vision, NPR, http://www.npr.org/about/aboutnpr/mission.html (last 
visited May 28, 2011).  To do this, NPR “produce[s], acquire[s], and distribute[s] programming that meets the 
highest standards of public service in journalism and cultural expression; [NPR] represent[s its] members in 
matters of their mutual interest; and provide[s] satellite interconnection for the entire public radio system.”  Id.  
More than 900 independent public radio stations throughout the United States combine local programming 
with programming from NPR and other sources to provide radio services for their audiences.  About NPR: 
Stations and Public Media, NPR, http://www.npr.org/about/aboutnpr/stations_publicmedia.html (last visited 
May 28, 2011).  This Article uses the term public radio loosely but recognizes the distinction between NPR 
and its members—local public radio stations. 
 102 Hansmann, supra note 22, at 850. 
 103 Id. at 849. 
 104 Id. 
 105 In addition, nonprofits address larger market failures such as, for example, in the provision of health 
care.  See Horwitz, supra note 14, at 1390, 1405. 
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Hansmann predicts that 
[i]f “pay radio” were to become commercially feasible—that is, if 
there were some inexpensive means of making receipt of a radio 
station’s broadcasts conditional upon payment of a periodic charge—
then profit-seeking firms also would be able to engage in 
commercial-free broadcasting simply by charging their listeners 
directly, as is already happening in the television industry via cable 
TV.  The result presumably would be a reduction in the willingness 
of listeners to make voluntary contributions to nonprofit stations, 
since such stations would no longer be as necessary to fill the need 
for commercial-free programming.  Thus pay radio might be 
expected to supplant nonprofit listener-supported stations.  Such a 
result would be more efficient, in fact, since the free-rider problem 
would be eliminated.106 
The reader may have anticipated where we are going.  “Pay radio” has 
become commercially feasible: SiriusXM provides a subscription-based 
service that allows its customers to receive myriad radio broadcasts, many of 
which are commercial free.107  Yet public radio audiences have increased since 
the advent of the commercial competitors, and donations had not decreased 
significantly, at least before the general economic downturn.108  I suggest the 
reason for this result is that Hansmann misidentified the good that public radio 
is selling. 
III.  SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY 
We have seen how nonprofits are facing pressure to justify their tax-
advantaged status and that the risk of agency costs appears high in the 
nonprofit form due to lack of policing constraints.  Yet the form persists.  
 
 106 Hansmann, supra note 22, at 854 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
 107 SIRIUS satellite radio provides more than 180 digital-quality channels, 71 of which are commercial-
free music channels.  What Is SiriusXM?, SIRIUSXM RADIO, http://www.siriusxm.com/whatissiriusxm (last 
visited May 28, 2011). 
 108 See Paul Farhi, Consider This: NPR Achieves Record Ratings, WASH. POST, Mar. 24, 2009, at C1; 
Press Release, NPR, NPR Ratings Hit New High: 26.5 Million Weekly Listeners (Mar. 15, 2007), available at 
http://www.npr.org/about/press/2007/031507.audience.html.  Although the federal government provides a 
portion of public radio’s budget, a significant source of income is derived from contributions, sponsorships, 
and grants.  These totals were $267.8 million (skewed by a bequest of nearly $200 million from a single donor) 
in 2004, $57.6 million in 2005, $56.2 million in 2006, $74.2 million in 2007, $62.5 million in 2008, $58.3 
million in 2009, and $63.4 million in 2010.  See Public Radio Finances, NPR, http://www.npr.org/about/ 
aboutnpr/publicradiofinances.html (last visited May 28, 2011) (providing direct links to Annual Reports for 
2004 and 2005 and audited statements for NPR Consolidated for 2006 and 2007). 
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Social identity theory, which has roots in the field of psychology, may well 
explain why nonprofits continue to exist, despite apparently unpoliced agency 
costs and new sources of competition with for-profits in areas such as 
commercial-free radio and microfinance.  Nonprofits might endure because the 
nonprofit form has the power to create something that the warm-glow-selling, 
for-profit firm cannot provide: a particularly valuable kind of warm glow 
associated with social identity. 
A. Introduction to Social Identity Theory 
Psychologists have been writing about identity and social identity theory 
for decades.109  Generally, the theory postulates that one’s concept of self is 
made up both of idiosyncratic traits (personal identity) and membership in 
various group categories (social identity).110  Social identity can be defined as 
“self-conception as a group member,”111 or “the individual’s knowledge that 
he/she belongs to certain social groups together with some emotional and value 
significance to him/her of the group membership.”112  It posits that an 
individual categorizes the world into units, and that one’s sense of self derives 
largely from the categories in which one belongs.113 
Social identity theory developed out of a desire for an understanding of 
social conflict at a group level, rather than an individual level,114 but is not so 
reductionist that it equates the individual with the sum of her group affiliations.  
It recognizes that personal identifications are often salient: “I am a friend of 
Suzie,” or “I need my morning coffee.”  But social identifications, such as “I 
am a Badgers football fan” or “I am a law professor,” are prominent, too.115  
Social identity grounds itself in “in group” versus “out of group” identification, 
and several foundational studies have examined how group identifications 
 
 109 See, e.g., Henry Tajfel & John Turner, An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict, in THE SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS 33 (William G. Austin & Stephen Worchel eds., 1979); SOCIAL 
IDENTITY THEORY (Dominic Abrams & Michael A. Hogg eds., 1990). 
 110 Blake E. Ashforth & Fred Mael, Social Identity Theory and the Organization, 14 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 
20, 20–21 (1989).  One trait can play both roles, however.  One could conceive of oneself merely as “having 
red hair,” or as being a “redhead” with associated traits of fiery temper, impulsiveness, or intelligence. 
 111 Dominic Abrams & Michael A. Hogg, An Introduction to the Social Identity Approach, in SOCIAL 
IDENTITY THEORY, supra note 109, at 1, 2. 
 112 Id. (quoting Henri Tajfel) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 113 Id. at 2–3. 
 114 See DONALD M. TAYLOR & FATHALI M. MOGHADDAM, THEORIES OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS 61–66 
(2d ed. 1994); Michael A. Hogg, Social Identity Theory, in CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL 
THEORIES 111, 112 (Peter J. Burke ed., 2006). 
 115 See Abrams & Hogg, supra note 112, at 4. 
RODRIGUES GALLEYSFINAL 6/29/2011  11:42 AM 
2011] ENTITY AND IDENTITY 1281 
form.116  The key teaching of this work is clear: The knowledge that one is a 
member of certain groups represents a constitutive part of one’s identity.117 
B. Social Identity and the Firm 
Identity theory provides special insight into a theory of a certain kind of 
firm—the nonprofit.118  While others have focused on why managers or 
employees behave as they do or why an organization chooses a particular 
aggregate identity,119 I am interested in why individuals are drawn to 
 
 116 For example, the work of Turner, Brown, and Tajfel showed that the mere act of individuals 
categorizing themselves as group members was sufficient to lead them to display in-group favoritism.  See 
J. C. Turner, R. J. Brown & H. Tajfel, Social Comparison and Group Interest in Ingroup Favouritism, 9 EUR. 
J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 187 (1979).  After being categorized into a group membership, individuals seek to achieve 
positive self-esteem by positively differentiating their in-group from a comparison out-group on some valued 
dimension.  This quest for positive distinctiveness means that people’s sense of who they are is defined in 
terms of “we” rather than “I.”  See id. at 190. 
 117 See TAYLOR & MOGHADDAM, supra note 114, at 83. 
 118 As Professors Smith and King suggest: 
Contracts offer organizations a unique opportunity to express their primary identity requirements: 
continuity and distinctiveness.  Given the importance of a clearly-defined identity for survival, 
organizations may use contracts to express identity, stating not only what they are but also what 
they are not.  In other words, contracts afford organizations the opportunity to stake out their 
identity and defend their claims to distinctiveness. 
D. Gordon Smith & Brayden G. King, Contracts as Organizations, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 34 (2009) (footnote 
omitted).  This proposal is close to my own argument, but Smith and King use specific organizations, such as a 
dairy cooperative association, and specific examples, including Pixar’s preserving its identity after acquisition 
by Disney.  See id. at 34–35. 
 119 Economists have made use of identity theory and have applied social identity theory’s insights to the 
firm to explore both “identity in organizations” and “identity of organizations.”  Many academics have looked 
at “identity in organizations,” or the identity of employees within the organization.  See, e.g., George A. 
Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, Identity and the Economics of Organizations, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 9 (2005) 
(using identity theory to model employee behavior); Ashforth & Mael, supra note 110, at 22 (exploring how 
an employee is shaped by her workplace and groups within the workplace); Michael A. Hogg, Social Identity 
and Misuse of Power: The Dark Side of Leadership, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1239 (2005) (applying social identity 
theory to explain why successful corporate managers tend toward conformity as a result of the tendency of 
groups to reinforce their own internal norms); Renee M. Jones, Law, Norms, and the Breakdown of the Board: 
Promoting Accountability in Corporate Governance, 92 IOWA L. REV. 105, 140–41 (2006) (using social 
identity theory to explain the failure of corporate boards, such as those of Enron or WorldCom, to engage in 
effective oversight, and describing how their tendency toward conformity leads them toward homogeneity and 
away from dissent and a willingness to ask questions). 
“Identity of organizations,” in contrast, focuses on concepts of corporate image and reputation, with the 
prototypical question being, “Who are we as an organization?”  See Stuart Albert & David A. Whetten, 
Organizational Identity, in 7 RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 263 (L. L. Cummings & Barry M. 
Staw eds., 1985).  Organizations are “social aggregates—collectivities or groups of individuals.”  David A. 
Whetten & Alison Mackey, A Social Actor Conception of Organizational Identity and Its Implications for the 
Study of Organizational Reputation, 41 BUS. & SOC’Y 393, 395 (2002).  So organizational identity is a set of 
shared beliefs about the identity of the organization.  Id.  The concept of identity of organizations views firms 
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participate in a nonprofit organization.120  I want to suggest that identity 
concepts can matter to participants in organizations other than managers and 
employees—particularly, to investors, donors, or consumers.  Indeed, identity 
concepts often determine the most fundamental question: the form of 
ownership an organization will take.121 
Because social identity theory comes from social psychology, its chief 
concern is the interaction between groups, including the origin and effects of 
discrimination.122  The key factors making up social identity are the 
“distinctiveness of the group’s values and practices in relation to those of 
comparable groups,” the salience of out-groups, and the prestige of the group 
in question.123  We will examine these characteristics, but the basic point is a 
 
themselves as social actors “authorized to engage in social intercourse as a collectivity and possessing rights 
and responsibilities as if the collectivity were a single individual.”  Id. 
 120 I am not the first to apply identity theory to firms.  Prior attempts looked at corporate image, the role 
identity plays in facilitating information transfer within the firm, and the branding effects of contracts on 
specific organizations.  Professors Kogut and Zander argue for an alternative, information-based theory of 
firms, based on the decreased barriers to communication and coordination that occur within firms: “[W]e 
proposed that a firm be understood as a social community specializing in the speed and efficiency in the 
creation and transfer of knowledge.”  Bruce Kogut & Udo Zander, What Firms Do? Coordination, Identity, 
and Learning, 7 ORG. SCI. 502, 503 (1996).  “This basic dichotomy between self-interest and the longing to 
belong is the behavioral underpinning to the superiority of firms over markets in resolving a fundamental 
dilemma: productivity grows with the division of labor but specialization increases the costs of communication 
and coordination.”  Id. at 502.  Firms exist not merely because of the transaction costs (including 
communication costs) outside their bounds, but also because the “shared identity” within the firm not only 
lowers the costs of communication, but also increases them by “establish[ing] explicit and tacit rules of 
coordination and influenc[ing] the direction of search and learning.”  Id. at 503.  This literature “argues that the 
chief function of the firm is not to solve hold-up problems but instead to facilitate the flow of the uncodifiable, 
living knowledge that animates innovation.”  Ronald J. Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation: Vertical 
Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 496–97 (2009). 
 121 Still, there are hints in the existing literature that organizational form itself is an exercise in identity 
creation: 
In identity terms, the selection of organizational forms makes up a self-categorization 
process whereby the organization’s memberships in identity categories or groups are declared.  
Examples of organizational forms/identity categories include church versus business 
organizational purpose, public versus private ownership, local versus global domain, and 
transportation versus utilities industry.  The sum of these choices constitutes the founders’ 
answer to the question “What type of organization/social actor are we forming?” 
Whetten & Mackey, supra note 119, at 398. 
 122 One account describes social identity theory as a European rejection of the “nice person” model of 
social psychology dominant in America, typified by statements such as “we like those who support us” or 
“understanding the point of view of another person promotes cooperation.”  TAYLOR & MOGHADDAM, supra 
note 114, at 64–66.  “As an alternative to the ‘nice person’ model of humankind, European social 
psychologists could rely upon an intellectual tradition, influenced by Marx and Freud, that presents a model of 
self-centered, irrational humankind struggling to improve their position in a conflict-based society.”  Id. at 80. 
 123 Ashforth & Mael, supra note 110, at 24–25 (emphasis omitted). 
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simple one: Nonprofits can create and “sell” a particular kind of identity, one 
in which an individual may participate as employee, donor, or volunteer.  This 
identity is the organization’s chief defense against agency costs: If managers 
stray too far from the entity’s nonprofit ethos, they will not merely suffer a loss 
of reputation, or risk sanctions for norm violation, or subject themselves and 
the entity to a reputational loss; they will injure—perhaps severely—the value 
of the enterprise itself. 
1. Distinctiveness of the Group’s Values and Practices in Relation to Those 
of Comparable Groups, and the Salience of Out-Groups 
What sets nonprofits apart as organizations is their ability to create a 
distinctive kind of identity.  The rhetoric of nonprofits often uses phrases like 
“giving back to the community,” “serving unmet needs,” or “preserving 
heritage, land or culture for future generations.”124  Trustees for a successful 
health care system125 serve only on a volunteer basis “for the good of patients 
and the community.”126  The Make-A-Wish Foundation “give[s] children with 
life-threatening medical conditions the chance to be anyone or anything, to go 
anywhere, to have anything, [and] to meet anyone” by making their wishes 
become reality.127  The American Red Cross’s mission is to “provide relief to 
victims of disaster and help people prevent, prepare for and respond to 
emergencies”;128 its goal is “preventing and relieving suffering.”129  While for-
profit companies may adopt “feel-good” marketing, branding, or positional 
strategies, it is understood that those goals are subsidiary to the profit 
 
 124 A counterexample that springs readily to mind is the trade association: the NFL, National Association 
of Broadcasters, Motion Picture Association of America, and the American Bar Association, for example, are 
nonprofits.  As Part IV.C describes, I classify these nonprofits as functioning more like cooperatives.  They 
exist to further the interests of their membership.  Identity is still a salient feature of the organization, but the 
organization exists specifically for the benefit of its members. 
 125 See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President to a Joint Session of Congress on Health Care 
(Sept. 9, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-to-a-
Joint-Session-of-Congress-on-Health-Care (“We have long known that some places—like the Intermountain 
Healthcare in Utah . . . —offer high-quality care at costs below average.”). 
 126 Annual Report to the Community for 2008: Trustees, INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTHCARE, http:// 
intermountainhealthcare.org/about/overview/annualreport2008/Pages/Trustees.aspx (last visited May 28, 
2011). 
 127 MAKE-A-WISH FOUND. OF AM., 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 2 (2009), available at http://www.wish.org/ 
content/download/8413/63676/version/1/file/MAWF_08_AnnualReport.pdf. 
 128 AM. RED CROSS, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT (2009), available at http://www.redcross.org/www-files/ 
Documents/pdf/corppubs/A501-08.pdf (quoting the mission statement of the American Red Cross). 
 129 About Us, AM. RED CROSS, www.redcross.org/aboutus (last visited May 28, 2011). 
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imperative.130  The core mission of the nonprofit, in contrast, is to maximize 
the output of some social good. 
The salience of out-groups is a difficult principle to apply to the nonprofit 
form because nonprofits and for-profits seldom compete with each other.  
Although, as discussed above, nonprofits generally make clear their different 
status, usually they cannot cite specific examples of for-profits similar enough 
to them to provide a relevant contrast.131  This principle is most notable in the 
cases of hospitals, nursing homes, and educational institutions, where we do 
see for-profits competing with nonprofits. 
2. Prestige of the Group 
Being a nonprofit means something to its employees because many of them 
are willing to accept lower salaries in exchange for the “psychic income” of 
working at a nonprofit.132  It also means something to its volunteer members, 
and to the outside world.  Brian Galle posits that there is a special form of 
warm glow provided by producing a charitable good at a charity, “where peers 
will know that the employee is making a sacrifice.”133  Members of the 
organization, both paid and unpaid, identify themselves with the organization 
and with its nonprofit form.  If it were to begin doling out large salaries or 
lavish perquisites, while an employee’s monetary income might rise, the 
identity value derived from being part of a nonprofit would fall.134 
Because of the history of social identity theory, which grew out of a need to 
understand discrimination, the emphasis on the prestige of one’s group can 
sound sinister.  But the point is merely that individuals wish to belong to 
 
 130 See Timothy M. Devinney, Is the Socially Responsible Corporation a Myth? The Good, the Bad, and 
the Ugly of Corporate Social Responsibility, ACAD. MGMT. PERSP., May 2009, at 44, 53–54. 
 131 REI might be an example of this distinctiveness, but it is a cooperative in form.  About REI, REI, 
http://www.rei.com/aboutrei/about_rei.html (last visited May 28, 2011). 
 132 See RON SAUNDERS, CANADIAN POLICY RESEARCH NETWORKS, PASSION AND COMMITMENT UNDER 
STRESS: HUMAN RESOURCES ISSUES IN CANADA’S NON-PROFIT SECTOR—A SYNTHESIS PAPER (2004), 
available at http://www.cprn.org/documents/25806_en.pdf; Peter Manzo, The Real Salary Scandal, STANFORD 
SOC. INNOVATION REV., Winter 2004, at 65, 66 (“Ask virtually any nonprofit employee and they’ll tell you 
they’re underpaid. . . .  When people choose a nonprofit career, they forgo opportunities to make much more 
money in the for-profit sector.”). 
 133 Galle, supra note 69, at 1223. 
 134 See Jeanne Sahadi, Feeling Underpaid?  Try This, CNNMONEY.COM (July 18, 2003, 1:23 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2003/07/17/commentary/everyday/sahadi/index.htm (“Running a humanitarian 
nonprofit will earn you many multiples less than what even the most incompetent . . . CEO can pull in.  But the 
mission’s the thing for those who devote their careers to helping others.” (emphasis omitted)). 
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groups that compare favorably with other groups.135  For nonprofits, the 
prestige comes from not being part of the for-profit world.  In a sense, 
nonprofits perceive all for-profit entities to be the out-group against which they 
define themselves.  Being a shareholder in IBM does not convey prestige or 
identity, beyond potential wealth.  But participation in a nonprofit conveys 
some aspect of identity and “prestige” to those who approve of the values the 
nonprofit entity espouses.  You will probably have some favorable (or 
unfavorable) impression of those who associate themselves with the American 
Cancer Society, Feed the Children, the American Red Cross, Habitat for 
Humanity, Planned Parenthood, the Metropolitan Museum of Art, the Humane 
Society, the Nature Conservancy, or the National Rifle Association.  The 
identity function of the nonprofit form explains why. 
C. Social Identity Versus Norms or the Expressive Function of Law 
How does social identity theory fit together with modern thinking about 
law?  In recent years, scholars have focused attention on law as both a 
reflection and source of social norms.  Claire Hill, for example, argues that 
“norms” result in the taking of actions because of what others think, while 
“identity” results in the taking of actions because of the kind of person one 
is.136  For example, frugality and sacrifice are forms of behavior that the 
outside world expects of nonprofits; the use of private jets, or first-class air 
travel, even for high-level executives of major nonprofits, might cause those 
outside the organization to conclude the nonprofit was not behaving 
appropriately.137  Actions of this sort are at odds with the identity of the 
nonprofit community; put simply, they indicate a desire for gain that 
contravenes the very nature of the nonprofit form as conceived by its members 
and employees. 
 
 135 TAYLOR & MOGHADDAM, supra note 114, at 83. 
 136 Claire A. Hill, The Law and Economics of Identity, 32 QUEEN’S L.J. 389, 414 (2007) (defining 
“norms” “as behavioural regularities enforced either externally, by a community, or internally, or both”); id. at 
399 (defining “identity” as “a person’s sense of self” (quoting George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, 
Economics and Identity, 115 Q.J. ECON. 715, 715 (2000)) (internal quotation mark omitted)). 
 137 See, e.g., Del Jones, Non-Profit Execs Make Millions, USA TODAY, Sept. 28, 2009, at 5B (“But CEOs 
of non-profits do not escape public outrage over pay, and some donors are surprised to learn that leadership 
isn’t voluntary . . . .”); Peter St. Onge, How Much Is Enough?—Nonprofit Leaders Debate Whether Charity 
Should Begin with Executive Paychecks, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Oct. 19, 2009, at 1A (“[There is a] widely 
held belief that individuals make a special commitment when they move into a charitable field, and should 
have a spirit of community sacrifice that also applies to a charity’s CEO. . . .  ‘For a charity, trust is the most 
important thing to have with the public’ . . . .” (quoting Ken Berger, President of Charity Navigator)). 
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Social identity theory also bears a close relationship to Cass Sunstein’s 
scholarship regarding the expressive function of law.138  Sunstein argues that 
law can operate as an expressive and effective articulation of values, even if it 
remains unenforced or underenforced.139  In addition, law’s expressive 
function allows it to change social norms.140  The nondistribution constraint of 
nonprofits serves to illustrate the point.  Even though the nondistribution 
constraint is virtually unenforced (because it can be evaded so readily via 
inflated salary, perquisites, and the like), it nevertheless shapes behavior by 
signaling what is expected.  Indeed, the nondistribution constraint is so central 
to the identity of nonprofits that, according to social identity theory, it qualifies 
as constitutive.  To the extent it serves an expressive function, it expresses 
fundamentally what the organization is about.  Without the identity-creation 
function and the distinctive kind of good it creates, the nonprofit would not 
exist. 
D. Return to Public Radio 
The identity function of the nonprofit organizational form explains 
SiriusXM’s nondeleterious effect on public radio.  Public radio sells more than 
just commercial-free radio.  Public radio listeners are a part of a community of 
listeners in a way that SiriusXM listeners are not.  True, there are free riders 
among the public radio audience, but an ethos of donation exists.  This ethos is 
unaffected by the SiriusXM alternative because commercial-free pay radio is 
not really an alternative to public radio: It cannot provide the identity that 
listening to and donating to public radio provides. 
Donations to the local stations that are affiliates of public radio confer an 
identity in a way that paying for a SiriusXM subscription does not.  An NPR 
patron thinks of herself as the sort of person who donates to public radio.  
There is a rhetoric of membership, of listener-supportedness.  A donation 
makes one a “friend” of public radio.141  Identity creation also explains why 
 
 138 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996). 
 139 Id. at 2032. 
 140 Id. at 2025. 
 141 From my local station: 
When you become a member of public radio, your contribution is more than a 
donation . . . more than a gift.  You’ll be telling us that public radio is valuable and worth 
supporting.  We, in turn, will do our best to make sure you get what you pay for.  It’s a great deal 
and one we hope you can’t refuse.  Call with your pledge donation now. 
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the rewards (“gifts”) for donation or service frequently are public expressions 
(tote bags, coffee mugs) of affiliation with the organization.  This rhetoric 
reflects the true nature of the good being sold: identity and membership in a 
larger community, rather than only the service of commercial-free radio. 
Social identity can similarly work to explain why nonprofits continue to 
exist in the face of the potential for widespread agency costs discussed in Part 
I.  The nonprofit form itself creates a special kind of identity, different in 
character from that of the for-profit firm.  This identity is a species of warm 
glow antithetical to the profit motive.  A more radical formulation of this 
concept is that certain experiences or feelings are “extramarket.”  Markets do 
not provide us with parental love or patriotic fervor, not because of market 
failure but because they simply exist outside the market.  And nonprofits’ 
species of warm glow is similarly extramarket.142 
E. Nonprofit Social Identity 
Nonprofits are not the only corporate entities in the identity business.  For-
profit firms create identities, too.  Indeed, the marketing industry centers on 
making the consumer identify with the goods they buy and consume.  Many 
consumers, for example, think of themselves as Ford (not GM) owners and as 
Mac (not PC) users.  Victor Fleischer has argued that Google’s branding 
guided how it structured its IPO.143  The identity value of some of these goods 
is created by scarcity—a Birkin bag or a Rolls Royce.  But much of it is just 
creating a belief within the consumer that her identity is closely tied with 
drinking Coke (or Pepsi), driving a Prius (or Hummer), and using a Kindle (or 
iPad). 
While consumption of goods or services creates most for-profit identity, 
occasionally a for-profit firm can generate an identity for investors as well as 
consumers.  Berkshire Hathaway is a near-perfect, if idiosyncratic, example.144  
In 2009 there were about 35,000 attendees at “Woodstock for Capitalists”—
 
Become a Friend of WUGA, WUGA, http://wuga.org/support_friend.html (last visited May 28, 2011) 
(alteration in original). 
 142 I thank Jill Horwitz for this insight. 
 143 Victor Fleischer, Brand New Deal: The Branding Effect of Corporate Deal Structures, 104 MICH. L. 
REV. 1581, 1584 (2006). 
 144 Another example of a for-profit firm whose identity output extends to past employees is McKinsey & 
Company.  See Alumni Center, MCKINSEY & CO., https://alumni.mckinsey.com/alumni/default/public/struts/ 
all/login.jsp (last visited May 28, 2011).  I am indebted to Jill Horwitz for this example. 
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Berkshire’s annual shareholder meeting;145 this when the average shareholder 
meeting is only sparsely attended.  Doubtless much of the interest in attending 
the meeting comes from hearing Berkshire’s CEO Warren Buffett, the famed 
“Oracle of Omaha,” speak, and the opportunity to ask him questions.  But the 
carnival-like atmosphere of the meeting, coupled with events including a 
dinner at Buffett’s favorite steak house and even commemorative stamps,146 
bespeaks a different culture from the typical public corporation.  There is a 
culture of community (built in part on a cult of personality) bound up with 
owning shares in this corporation.  Even viewing Berkshire as an extreme case, 
many for-profit firms are undeniably in the business of identity creation.  For-
profits like Nike and Apple are adept at convincing us that consuming their 
goods sets us apart.147 
While for-profits create identity, I am suggesting here that the nonprofit 
form can create a different kind of identity, one bound up with warm glow in a 
way that for-profit identity cannot be.  It is more difficult—arguably 
impossible—for a for-profit entity to sell an identity of saving wildlife or 
feeding the hungry in the way that the National Wildlife Foundation or a 
nonprofit soup kitchen can.  Certain goods or experiences are cheapened by the 
profit motive.  By donating money to a local soup kitchen, some people obtain 
warm glow because they are helping others.  Other people enjoy a feeling of 
identity as someone who helps the needy in their community.  A thought 
experiment helps to explain this phenomenon.  Imagine that one can donate to 
either a for-profit or a nonprofit that provides housing for the homeless.  To 
which of these entities would you donate funds?  If you (like me) lean toward 
the nonprofit entity, this is because when the donor is aware that the donation 
is to a for-profit group, the identity function is lessened and, as a result, the 
warm glow dims. 
 
 145 See, e.g., Letter from Warren E. Buffett, Chairman of the Bd. of Dirs., Berkshire Hathaway Inc., to 
Shareholders, Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (Feb. 26, 2010), available at http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/ 
letters/2009ltr.pdf (“Our best guess is that 35,000 people attended the annual meeting last year. . . .  With our 
shareholder population much expanded, we expect even more this year.”).  Meetings are held at the Qwest 
Center in Omaha, Nebraska, and subsidiaries of Berkshire Hathaway—such as GEICO and Bookworm—offer 
samples or discounts on their products.  Id. 
 146 See generally BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC., BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY ANNUAL SHAREHOLDERS 
MEETING MAY 1, 2010: VISITOR’S GUIDE (2010), available at http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/meet01/ 
VisGuide2010.pdf. 
 147 Identity and image are related but different concepts.  Identity has to do with constitutive, 
organizational self-conception, whereas image is what members think outsiders think about the organization, 
what outsiders actually think about organization, and sometimes what members project or present about the 
organization to influence what outsiders think.  Whetten & Mackey, supra note 119, at 400. 
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As an empirical matter, the question of why donors give to nonprofits is a 
difficult one.  Factors such as empathy, sympathy, fear, guilt, pity, and trust148 
have all been postulated.  Field data and laboratory data yield conflicting 
results on whether altruism (concern for others’ welfare) or warm glow 
motivates donors.149  Relatively little work has focused on the role of identity 
in charitable donation—the data comes largely from surveys that ask about 
motives, eliciting responses such as “to receive tax breaks” or “personal pride,” 
rather than responses that elicit a perception of shared social identity.150  Even 
so, early research suggests that social identity plays a role in the decision of a 
donor to give.151 
Two concepts from behavioral economics, availability bias and framing 
effects, offer insight as to why for-profits fail to generate a full measure of 
warm glow.  Availability bias refers generally to the idea that people make 
decisions based on information “that is particularly salient, vivid, or easily 
‘available’ to them.”152  Research has found that simply increasing the salience 
of privacy concerns—for example, by reassuring people that their privacy will 
be protected—can paradoxically make people more concerned about the issue, 
presumably by bringing it to the forefront of their minds.153 
Numerous studies have also demonstrated the importance of framing 
effects—that is, the fact that how questions are framed affects individual 
choices.  In the classic study, individuals were told that they had to choose 
between alternative vaccine programs to combat a disease that would kill 600 
people if nothing were done.  When confronted with two equivalent choices, 
one framed in terms of lives lost and the other in terms of lives saved, people 
prefer the “lives saved” alternative.154 
 
 148 Adrian Sargeant et al., Perceptual Determinants of Nonprofit Giving Behavior, 59 J. BUS. RES. 155, 
156 (2006). 
 149 Heidi Crumpler & Philip J. Grossman, An Experimental Test of Warm Glow Giving, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 
1011, 1013–14 (2008). 
 150 Glen Riecken & Ugur Yavas, Monetary Donations to Charitable Organizations: A Case Study, 
SERVICES MARKETING Q., Oct. 2007, at 67, 73 tbl.2. 
 151 Jennifer L. Aaker & Satoshi Akutsu, Why Do People Give? The Role of Identity in Giving, 19 J. 
CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 267, 268–69 (2009). 
 152 Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market 
Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 662 (1999). 
 153 See, e.g., Joseph Bonneau & Sören Preibusch, The Privacy Jungle: On the Market for Data Protection 
in Social Networks, 8 WORKSHOP ON ECON. INFO. SECURITY 29 (2009), available at http://weis09.infosecon. 
net/files/156/paper156.pdf. 
 154 Hanson & Kysar, supra note 152, at 644–45 (citing Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, 
Values, and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOL. 341, 343 (1984)). 
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Put simply, context matters.  And—according to the argument made here—
the traditional for-profit form creates a background context that is not 
conducive to the production of an identity in which altruism and warm glow 
predominate.  For-profit charity promoters Malani and Posner argue that 
rational donors should choose a for-profit firm that can guarantee lower 
administrative costs over a nonprofit, which at best implies lower overhead 
through a weakly enforced nondistribution constraint, but also carries the 
baggage of increased agency costs.155  They cite as reassurance for donors the 
fact that a for-profit charity would have to inform potential donors of 
administrative costs involved, and the profit to be made, and would face 
penalties under federal and state consumer protection laws for fraudulent 
misrepresentations.156  It would also have to apportion fees for third-party 
monitoring.157 
The picture is not as simple as Malani and Posner suggest.  Consumer 
protection laws would indeed require informing potential donors of the profit 
being made and the administrative costs incurred.  Providing that information 
is costly in more ways than simply increasing compliance costs.  By increasing 
the salience of the fact that some (perhaps much) of the donation will go not to 
the cause that the donor seeks to serve, but instead to administrative costs and 
to serve the profit motives of the owners, the for-profit increases the salience 
of the profit motive itself.  It reduces the donation to a mere monetary 
exchange, a diminution likely to dim the warm-glow impulses of many a 
would-be donor. 
A nonprofit’s form allows it to create enhanced warm glow by 
downplaying the fact that not all of a donor’s money goes to the targets of 
charitable giving.  Malani and Posner might scoff at this as mere illusion,158 
but the identity function also performs real work in the organization.  By 
taking away the profit incentive, the nonprofit form requires the organization 
to focus on other ends.  The creation of a unique identity works to reduce 
agency costs because a nonprofit organization will be hard-pressed to market a 
distinctive warm-glow good if agency costs become too obvious.  High salaries 
and other rent-seeking thus occur less often than we might expect in nonprofits 
 
 155 But see Galle, supra note 69, at 1214–15 (complicating this basic premise); Hines et al., supra note 4, 
at 1183 (same). 
 156 Malani & Posner, supra note 25, at 2036–37, 2051. 
 157 Galle, supra note 69, at 1214–15. 
 158 Malani & Posner, supra note 25, at 2051. 
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because it is understood that these actions are inconsistent with the 
organization’s central purpose. 
This identity is more than morality, although the two concepts do overlap 
in application.  Jill Horwitz argues that what separates charitable nonprofits is 
the moral (as well as legal) obligation to advance the charitable goals that they 
have chosen.159  She emphasizes that these organizations are legally and 
morally bound to work toward charitable ends in a way that for-profits are not, 
which makes them appear to donors more likely to fulfill the donors’ desired 
ends.  Social identity is broader in reach than Horwitz’s theory because it 
encompasses noncharitable nonprofits as well—membership organizations 
such as a local runner’s club may lack the moral obligations that apply to a 
charitable hospital.  Both might still provide social identity, but the charitable 
organization’s identity will have a distinctly moral cast. 
The preceding discussion shows why the nonprofit form creates an identity 
distinct from for-profits.  But how does this special nonprofit social identity 
come to be?  The nonprofit form creates an identity distinct from for-profits by 
virtue of the central feature of its organizational structure, the nondistribution 
constraint.  While generally not articulated in formal terms to nonprofit 
participants, the nondistribution constraint translates in practice to the shared 
idea among employees, donors, volunteers, and patrons that the organization is 
not “in it for the money” (even if considerable profits are being made and 
retained).  But donors must believe that the nondistribution constraint has bite, 
that it actually constrains even in the absence of enforcement mechanisms as 
discussed in Part I. 
The unique social identity of nonprofits functions as both the product being 
“sold” and the mechanism that makes the nondistribution constraint credible 
by creating a basis for nonprofit participants—donors, employees, and 
customers—to trust the organization.  Larry Ribstein defines trust as “the 
willingness to make oneself vulnerable to another without costly external 
constraints”160—after all, if external forces like legal sanctions force 
individuals to behave, we ultimately trust not the individuals themselves but 
the efficacy of those sanctions.  “Strong form” trust is the most essential 
version of trust, where the trusted individual (or, as here, nonprofit institution) 
is “free to breach but ‘opportunistic behavior would violate values, principles, 
and standards of behavior that have been internalized by parties to an 
 
 159 Horwitz, supra note 14, at 1386. 
 160 Larry E. Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 553, 555 (2001). 
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exchange.’”161  In the nonprofit that offers social identity, donors and patrons 
have a reason for their strong form trust, even in the absence of legal 
enforcement: social identity.  If the organization violates the nondistribution 
constraint by paying its managers too high a salary, for example, it risks 
destroying the very social identity that makes it attractive to its employees and 
customers. 
Not all nonprofits are donative organizations: Trade associations and social 
clubs are nonprofits, too.  The special abilities of the nonprofit form to create 
an identity apply to these organizations no less than to charitable organizations.  
Imagine a for-profit fraternity.  Here, one is paying to be a member of a group 
constructed solely for the purposes of generating profit.  The concept is 
incoherent because the point of the organization is to provide something 
intangible.  We might well pay to be members of an association, but we will 
hesitate to do so if we know that part of the price of the ticket is destined to 
line someone’s pocket. 
IV.  ENTITY AND IDENTITY 
This Article’s hypothesis is that entity form itself permits the creation of a 
different kind of good.  Although the preceding section explored this 
hypothesis by way of the nonprofit form, its application is not limited to 
nonprofits.  A community’s local food cooperative, for example, may 
ostensibly compete with Whole Foods.  Both offer a range of organic foods 
and produce, often in bulk, with an emphasis on whole grains and alternative, 
herbal, or homeopathic treatments.  But the cooperative’s product on offer is 
not merely organic food; it is also investment in the local community and its 
farmers.162  The cooperative thus creates and markets a different product, one 
grounded as much in the local community and democratic governance as in 
profits. 
 
 161 Id. at 557 (quoting Jay B. Barney & Mark H. Hansen, Trustworthiness as a Source of Competitive 
Advantage, 15 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 175, 179 (1994)).  Ribstein distinguishes “semi-strong form” trust (where 
the parties have set up structures to protect themselves, but are still vulnerable to opportunism), and “weak 
form” trust (where the presence of legal constraints means that a party actually exposes herself to very little 
risk).  Id. at 557–58. 
 162 The author’s hometown, for example, has such a co-op, whose mission is to “strive[] to embody 
progressive cultural transformation through socially and environmentally conscious practices as a 
democratically run, not-for-profit natural foods store.”  About Daily, DAILY GROCERIES CO-OP, http://www. 
dailygroceries.org/about (last visited May 28, 2011).  This Article posits that similar organizations exist in 
most medium to large cities and in most college towns. 
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Vast heterogeneity marks nonprofits, which encompass groups as disparate 
as the National Football League (NFL), Harvard University, Consumers Union 
(which publishes Consumer Reports), the Mayo Clinic, and the World Wildlife 
Fund.  Social identity works differently within different groups, and the 
following typology of nonprofits helps to show why. 
A. Service Providers 
These firms provide the public with a service and largely compete based on 
the market for services.  Although Hansmann’s theory predicts that these will 
be nonprofits because of contract failure,163 Malani and David’s study indicates 
that few, in fact, signal their nonprofit status.164  Their finding may be limited 
to service providers, however, as I postulate that the identity function of the 
nonprofit is doing little to no work in this setting.  Parents looking for a 
daycare today, for example, shop based on the training and certification of the 
staff, the facilities, references, and perhaps, the availability of video cameras to 
provide monitoring.  Accordingly, signaling nonprofit status may be of little 
competitive use in this context. 
1. Hospitals 
The existence of both nonprofit and for-profit hospitals in the same market 
is largely a historical accident.  “Voluntary hospitals” were financially 
supported and operated by the more fortunate and powerful members of 
society.165  While the rich founded these early hospitals, the poor were almost 
exclusively the patients; the wealthy stayed at home and called doctors for 
house visits.166  This difference in the delivery of medical care disappeared in 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries for a variety of reasons.  Advancements 
 
 163 Hansmann, supra note 22. 
 164 See supra notes 96–98 and accompanying text.  Note that this section is aimed solely at addressing 
Malani and David’s use of the lack of nonprofit-hospital signaling to refute Hansmann’s hypothesis.  It 
consciously ignores the rich literature comparing nonprofit and for-profit hospitals.  For an example, see Jill R. 
Horwitz & Austin Nichols, Hospital Ownership and Medical Services: Market Mix, Spillover Effects, and 
Nonprofit Objectives, 28 J. HEALTH ECON. 924 (2009) (arguing that a nonprofit hospital’s provision of medical 
services depends on the concentration of for-profits in the area). 
 165 Anthony R. Kovner, Hospitals, in JONAS AND KOVNER’S HEALTH CARE DELIVERY IN THE UNITED 
STATES 145, 147 (Anthony R. Kovner & Steven Jonas eds., 7th ed. 2002) (discussing the characteristics of the 
first types of hospitals in the United States). 
 166 MARSHALL W. RAFFEL & CAMILLE K. BARSUKIEWICZ, THE U.S. HEALTH SYSTEM: ORIGINS AND 
FUNCTIONS 120 (5th ed. 2002) (“The success of these hospitals depended on the willingness of the wealthy to 
help the poor because poor sick people were virtually all of the hospital’s patients.  It was still preferable to 
endure illnesses at home, if possible, and the wealthy were better equipped to do this.”). 
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in medicine required more equipment than a traveling doctor could reasonably 
carry, so hospitals became a necessity to practice evolving medicine.167  
Doctors, adapting to a new era of medicine, responded by founding doctor-
owned hospitals operated for profit, especially during the period from 1890 to 
1920.168  Advancements in medicine changed the role of hospitals because 
more treatments were becoming available; hospitals were no longer simply 
places for the poor to await impending death.169  As more individuals moved to 
cities and lost the support of family and community, hospitals gained 
importance.  Additionally, hospitals began to play an increasingly important 
role in the training and education of future members of the medical 
profession.170 
According to the American Hospitals Association, the United States has 
2,918 nonprofit hospitals, 998 for-profit hospitals, and 1,092 government 
hospitals, for a total of 5,008 hospitals nationwide.171  Adjusted to account for 
different size hospitals, in nonrural areas nonprofits made up approximately 
74% of total hospital admissions, for-profit hospitals approximately 11%, and 
government approximately 15%.172  The role of these different categories of 
hospitals and the policy rationales for providing nonprofits with tax 
exemptions has long been the subject of controversy.173  Nonprofit hospitals 
are required to produce “community benefits” to qualify for beneficial tax 
treatment and exemptions, but the definition of that phrase is not certain.174  
Empirical studies that have analyzed and compared the three categories of 
 
 167 Kovner, supra note 165, at 147 (“Medical care became too complex for physicians to carry their entire 
armamentarium in their little black bags; special equipment and consultation with other medical specialists 
became essential.”). 
 168 Id. 
 169 Id. (discussing advancements in medicine that contributed to the increasing use of hospitals and a 
change in patient types). 
 170 RAFFEL & BARSUKIEWICZ, supra note 166, at 123 (“Hospitals became important centers for 
disseminating new knowledge and places where all classes of society could benefit from treatment.”). 
 171 Fast Facts on US Hospitals, AM. HOSP. ASS’N (Dec. 7, 2010), http://www.aha.org/aha/content/2010/ 
pdf/101207fastfacts.pdf (providing statistics on the numbers and categories of United States hospitals from a 
2009 survey to be included in a 2011 report). 
 172 Jill R. Horwitz & Austin Nichols, What Do Nonprofits Maximize? Nonprofit Hospital Service 
Provision and Market Ownership Mix 38 tbl.1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13246, 
2007), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w13246. 
 173 See supra Introduction. 
 174 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUB. NO. 2707, NONPROFIT HOSPITALS AND THE PROVISION OF COMMUNITY 
BENEFITS 1 (2006) (“Although nonprofit hospitals must provide community benefits in order to receive tax 
exemptions, there is little consensus on what constitutes a community benefit or how to measure such 
benefits.”). 
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hospitals have faced difficulties such as limited data availability175 and source 
information that provides a low level of detail.176 
There have been periodic calls for nonprofit hospitals to provide more 
community benefits, charity care, or both in exchange for the tax exemption 
they receive.177  But seen through the lens of identity, nonprofit hospitals are 
generally not—at least, not any longer—organizations that provide an identity 
function that distinguishes them in any meaningful way from their for-profit 
counterparts.  Both forms of hospitals compete in the same markets.  Patients 
and their attending physicians choose one hospital over another not based on 
nonprofit versus for-profit status, but instead because of the attractiveness and 
sophistication of the facilities offered.  Put simply, in a field where the value of 
the service provided to consumers dominates decision making, any warm glow 
associated with the nonprofit form is likely to be of little consequence to 
patients (but not donors).  An exception may be religious hospitals, which may 
enjoy increased identity benefits because of their particular religious 
affiliation. 
2. Consumers Union 
Consumers Union of the United States (CU) is a nonprofit 501(c)(3) 
consumer watchdog that publishes Consumer Reports magazine and other print 
and web consumer reports.178  CU tests and evaluates thousands of products 
every year at its National Testing and Research Center.179  Beyond its reporting 
function, CU testifies before Congress and regulatory agencies and files 
lawsuits on behalf of consumers.180 
 
 175 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-743T, NONPROFIT, FOR-PROFIT, AND GOVERNMENT 
HOSPITALS: UNCOMPENSATED CARE AND OTHER COMMUNITY BENEFITS 2 & n.4 (2005) (noting that 
“[r]eliable, hospital-specific data were not available nationwide” and explaining the rationale for selecting five 
states for the study: California, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, and Texas (quoting David M. Walker, Comptroller 
General of the United States)). 
 176 Numerous studies comparing nonprofit and for-profit hospitals exist.  Mark Schlesinger and Bradford 
Gray examined roughly seventy-five studies in 2006.  See Mark Schlesinger & Bradford H. Gray, How 
Nonprofits Matter in American Medicine, and What to Do About It, 25 HEALTH AFF. W287 (2006), http:// 
content.healthaffairs.org/content/25/4/W287.full.html.  Still, many studies raise problematic issues about 
measurability of outputs and comparability of institutions.  See Horwitz, supra note 14, at 1363. 
 177 LUNDER & LIU, supra note 19, at 6. 
 178 Hoover’s Company Records, In-Depth Records of Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. (Jan. 
18, 2011), available at LexisNexis. 
 179 Id. 
 180 Id.  Among the purposes of CU set forth in its certificate of incorporation are: the provision of 
information and counsel on consumers’ goods; the provision of aid to efforts to create decent living standards 
for consumers; the maintenance of labs and the supervision of research to accomplish the goals of the 
RODRIGUES GALLEYSFINAL 6/29/2011  11:42 AM 
1296 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 60 
CU is required, under its certificate of incorporation, to use all of its 
income to carry out the purposes of the organization.181  CU generates income 
from the sale of Consumer Reports and from noncommercial contributions, 
grants, and fees.182  It accepts no advertising, does not permit commercial use 
of its ratings or comments, and does not accept free samples from 
manufacturers; rather, the organization buys all of its test samples.183  In 2009, 
CU generated more than $250 million in revenue and employed over 600 
workers.184 
One could argue CU’s nonprofit status is necessary for it to credibly 
commit that it will not be swayed by profit demands into currying favor with 
paying advertisers by delivering slanted, rather than truly unbiased, opinions.  
And yet successful for-profit ratings organizations exist across a variety of 
products—from the magazine Cook’s Illustrated, which employs the bonding 
mechanism of refusing paid advertisements, to Robert Parker’s influential wine 
rankings,185 to ratings agencies like Standard & Poor’s—and depend upon 
reputational capital for success: If their ratings are shown to be inaccurate or 
biased, their legitimacy, and thus their profitability, will suffer.186 
CU, then, has a bifurcated identity.  As a provider of a product-rating 
service, CU’s nonprofit status is largely irrelevant; a desire to preserve its 
reputational capital would force it to act in unbiased fashion even if it were a 
for-profit entity because it is essentially selling trustworthiness.  Still, CU’s 
lobbying and filing suits on behalf of consumers reveal more of a social 
identity function, a characteristic that a for-profit could not provide. 
B. Donative Organizations 
Unlike service-providing nonprofits, nonprofits dependent chiefly on 
donations emphasize the social identity that membership or donation provides.  
 
corporation; and the preparation and distribution of all materials resulting from the work of the corporation.  
See Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. Income Tax Return for 2006, Form 990, General Explanation 
Attachment 5 [hereinafter CU Tax Return], available at http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/resources/ 
streaming/PDFs/CU-990-2006-copy-for-public-inspection.pdf. 
 181 See CU Tax Return, supra note 180. 
 182 Hoover’s Company Records, supra note 178. 
 183 Id.; Report a Violation to the No Commercial Use Policy, CONSUMERREPORTS.ORG, http://www. 
consumerreports.org/cro/aboutus/adviolation/index.htm (last visited May 28, 2011). 
 184 Hoover’s Company Records, supra note 178. 
 185 Thanks to Steven Schwarcz for this example. 
 186 Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox, 2002 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1, 14. 
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And this identity depends on the nonprofit status of the organization.  For-
profit organizations dedicated to preserving wildlife, curing cancer, or even 
promoting and protecting gun ownership in the United States could plausibly 
be imagined.  Given equal tax treatment, each could make a case for being 
more effective at promoting its particular cause.  Increased transparency and 
outside certification could assure a potential warm-glow consumer that the 
firm was directing a reasonable proportion of each dollar earned to the desired 
cause.  And yet, warm-glow consumers would favor the Wildlife Conservancy 
over a for-profit counterpart because giving to the former organization creates 
a social identity that paying a for-profit entity does not.  The same holds true 
for the American Cancer Society and National Rifle Association.  The salience 
of the profit motive would dim any potential warm glow the for-profit could 
offer. 
1. The Green Bay Packers 
The Green Bay Packers team is in some sense the ultimate example of an 
identity-based organization because it is a non-tax-exempt nonprofit 
organization.187  That is to say, although the Green Bay Packers corporation is 
a nonprofit, it is not a tax-exempt organization.  Although stock certificates are 
issued, the stock is largely ceremonial because no profits (i.e., dividends) may 
be distributed.  New shareholders have diluted voting rights, and shareholders 
may not sell their stock.  Thus, shareholders have no possibility of making a 
profit on their “investment” and receive no tax deduction for their money.188  
Indeed, one could fairly say that being a shareholder of the Green Bay Packers 
 
 187 The Green Bay Packers was incorporated in 1923 as a nonprofit organization and engaged in its first of 
three stock drives in 1923.  Shareholders, PACKERS.COM, http://www.packers.com/community/shareholders. 
html (last visited May 28, 2011).  In 1935, the team was reorganized as a nonprofit stock corporation under 
Wisconsin law and issued 300 shares of common stock.  Greenbay Packer Fans: Owners and Shareholders, 
ALLGREENBAYPACKERS.COM (June 23, 2010), http://www.jerseyal.com/GBP/2010/06/23/green-bay-packer-
fans-owners-and-shareholders.  Two more stock sales followed (in 1950, and late 1997 through early 1998) to 
raise the total number of Packer shareholders to over 112,000, holding 4.75 million shares of stock.  
Shareholders, supra. 
 188 Lynn Reynolds Hartel, Comment, Community-Based Ownership of a National Football League 
Franchise: The Answer to Relocation and Taxpayer Financing of NFL Teams, 18 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 589, 594 
(1998); see also Richard Sandomir, Packer Fans Embrace Unusual Stock, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1997, at C2 
(“[T]he buyer [of Packer stock] will get no dividends, no share price appreciation, no spoils if the team is sold, 
no securities law protection, no tickets to Lambeau Field, no charitable tax deduction, no merchandise 
discounts, no financial reports and no option to transfer ownership to anyone but a family member as a gift.”).  
At the time of the 1997 sale, team counsel Lance Lopes noted fans’ excitement about owning a part of the 
team and helping to contribute to the capital of the corporation.  Id.  He commented that “naysayers criticize 
[the stock sale] for the lack of investment and security, but the beauty is we’re not marketing it to them.”  Id. 
(internal quotation mark omitted). 
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entitles one only to be a shareholder of the Green Bay Packers.  Cynics would 
say that it is the NFL’s profit sharing that allows a relatively small city like 
Green Bay to support an NFL franchise.  But the point I am making is not 
about financial viability, but rather that one spends money on a share that holds 
no management authority and no possibility of a return on investment to create 
and participate in a social identity. 
Each individual trait of Packers ownership supports the proposition that it 
is really identity that the Packers are selling—the social identity of belonging 
to an organization closely identified with a legendary history rooted in a small 
city in Wisconsin.189  Most shareholders are Green Bay residents,190 
 
 189 The following passage, written by my colleague Dan Coenen, who grew up in Appleton, Wisconsin, 
captures something of the magic of the Packers: 
What is this sacred thing that is the Green Bay Packers?  It is the team of Lambeau and 
Lombardi, and the great stadium and busy street that will always bear their names.  It is the 
homeplace of Herber, Hutson, and Hornung.  And of modern heroes, too—like Lofton, Sharpe, 
Butler, and Woodson. 
The Packers are the team of the underdog—of seventeenth-round pick Bart Starr, undrafted 
free-agent Willie Wood, former high school coach Mike Holmgren, the once-homeless Donald 
Driver.  The Packers are a team of names that define the very meaning of athletic competition—
Johnny “Blood” McNally, Clark Hinkle, Forrest Gregg, Ray Nitschke, Jimmy Taylor, Reggie 
White, Brett Favre. 
The Packers are a team of constancy and tradition.  The team that for 90 years has been a 
pillar of its league.  That has played in one city longer than any other NFL franchise.  That has 
won more championships than any other NFL club. 
The Packers are the team of the ordinary person—owned by 112,120 fans, whose shares do 
not have a dime’s worth of financial value and never will.  It is the team that in 1920 was brought 
into the NFL by a local meat-canning company.  A team that was saved by its community in 
1923, when 400 supporters gathered in an Elks Lodge to pitch in $5000 to keep it afloat.  And 
saved again in 1935, and then again in 1950, with still more purchases of worthless stock made 
by local citizens, including (or so the story goes) a woman who showed up at the team office with 
$25 in quarters collected in a matchbox. 
The Packers are the team of small town America.  The team that represents on the 
international stage a city of 100,000 people.  The team that operates in what is by far the smallest 
metropolitan area, with by far the smallest television market, of any NFL, NHL, NBA and MLB 
club. 
The Packers are the Green and Gold.  The pride of the Black and Blue Division.  The great 
rival of the Chicago Bears.  The antithesis of the Dallas Cowboys.  The Packers are the team of 
Cheeseheads.  The team of the Lambeau Leap.  The team of bratwursts and beer. 
The Packers are the team of TitleTown, USA.  The team that won the Ice Bowl and the first 
Super Bowl.  The team that, during the Glory Years of the 1960s, became so mighty that in a 
single decade it claimed five NFL championships, including three in consecutive seasons.  A 
team that so dominated an era that it produced even the most deserving player not yet inducted 
into the NFL Hall of Fame—five-time All-Pro, Jerry Kramer, who remains excluded only 
because so many of his teammates (ten in all) gained entry before him. 
The Packers are the team that, even while producing only three winning seasons during all of 
the 1970s and 1980s, packed its stadium for every game it played.  The Packers are the team that 
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demonstrating a strong sense of place.  Stock may not be sold but may be 
given as gifts,191 emphasizing the noncommercial nature of the “ownership.”  
Besides the right to elect a board (which carries no say in management of the 
team itself), shareholders have a veto on moving the Packers outside of Green 
Bay,192 underlining the strong sense of identity and connection to place.  To 
protect against one person (or a small group of persons) taking control of the 
team, the articles of incorporation prohibit any shareholder from owning more 
than 200,000 shares.193  Although shareholders do not receive coveted tickets 
to Packers games at Lambeau Field, there is an annual Shareholders Day, 
which is attended by thousands194 (unlike the often sparsely attended 
shareholders meeting of a public corporation).  What is more, the events of 
Shareholders Day focus on key elements of the team’s identity—tailgating 
parties, visits to the Packers Hall of Fame, and the purchase of special 
shareholder paraphernalia.195 
The Packers organization may present a special case because all sports 
teams in the United States provide strong identity benefits to members of their 
communities.  It might well be that if the Packers were for-profit, their fans 
would still pay for the privilege of being “owners,” even if they were to derive 
no financial benefit from that ownership.  Nevertheless, Packers fans place in 
stark relief the point that people are sometimes willing to contribute to an 
 
for six decades has seen its season-ticket waiting list grow so fast that it now numbers 81,112 and 
includes would-be buyers who have been on it for more than 30 years.  The Packers are the team 
that, according to current projections, will be unable to sell tickets to the fans who apply for them 
today until, at the earliest, 2074. 
The Packers are the team of the “frozen tundra,” with its still-domeless stadium in an era of 
professional sports comfort and glitz.  The team of sub-zero tailgaters, who come to the shrine of 
their team—and often to away games as well—from every walk of life.  The team of fans decked 
out in hunting boots, snowsuits, and ski-masks.  The team of fans who dreamt the night before of 
a frosted field and the piercing chill of a bitter-cold December Sunday afternoon. 
The Packers are of, by and for the people of Wisconsin.  They stayed when the Braves left.  
They always will stay.  They are in the very air that the people of their city and their state inhale.  
They are what those of us who cherish their legacy most hope for ourselves to be—open to 
dreams, filled with purpose, spirited, resilient, unpretentious and, on our best days, a source to 
others of meaning, memories, and joy. 
Statement of Dan T. Coenen, Professor, Univ. of Ga. Sch. of Law (Apr. 14, 2011) (on file with author). 
 190 Hartel, supra note 188, at 594. 
 191 Sandomir, supra note 188. 
 192 Hartel, supra note 188, at 594. 
 193 Shareholders, supra note 187. 
 194 Sandomir, supra note 188. 
 195 2008 Shareholders Meeting, PACKERS.COM, http://www.packers.com/media-lounge/photo-gallery/ 
2008-Annual-Shareholders-Meeting/614be167-7dc8-11df-82b7-d3ef363e9531 (last visited May 28, 2011). 
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organization with no goal other than deriving identity benefits from 
participating in the organization itself. 
A casebook chestnut, Shlenksy v. Wrigley,196 helps reveal the special value 
that the nonprofit form creates for the Green Bay Packers.  Students of 
corporate law will remember that a minority shareholder, Shlenksy, sued the 
directors of the Chicago National League Ball Club, Inc., owner of the Chicago 
Cubs, for failing to install lights in Wrigley Field and institute night baseball 
games.197  The case illustrates the power of the business judgment rule: 
Directors’ actions cannot be questioned absent fraud, illegality, or conflict of 
interest.  For our purposes, what is interesting is that Wrigley, who owned 80% 
of the firm’s shares, may have been interested in running the corporation in a 
way that “protect[ed] values such as tradition and concern for neighbors, even 
at the expense of short-term profit.”198  While the business judgment rule 
provides a shield, such goals and motives of majority owners in a for-profit 
organization are vulnerable to minority shareholder attacks.  One cannot run a 
for-profit corporation as a “semi-eleemosynary institution.”199  In contrast, the 
nonprofit structure of the Packers ensures that a Shlenksy-style suit could never 
even be brought against the management. 
2. Wikimedia 
The Wikimedia Foundation, Inc. (Wikimedia)200 offers another example of 
the power of social identity.  The reader is doubtless familiar with Wikipedia, 
 
 196 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968). 
 197 Id. at 778. 
 198 Geoffrey Miller, Narrative and Truth in Judicial Opinions: Corporate Charitable Giving Cases, 2009 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 831, 842–43.  Indeed, George Will, upon considering investing in the Cubs, was told by a 
Cubs shareholder to ignore “price-earnings ratios, return on capital, and a bunch of other hogwash which has 
no place in a transaction between two true sportsmen.”  LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & PETER V. LETSOU, BUSINESS 
ASSOCIATIONS 380 (4th ed. 2003) (quoting GEORGE F. WILL, PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS AND OTHER SOBERING 
THOUGHTS 311 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 199 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 683 (Mich. 1919). 
 200 The Wikimedia Foundation, Inc. is a 501(c)(3) tax deductible, nonprofit charity (categorized by the 
IRS as adult, continuing education) whose mission is “to empower a global volunteer community to collect 
and develop the world’s knowledge and to make it available to everyone for free, for any purpose.”  
Frequently Asked Questions, WIKIMEDIA FOUND., http://wikimediafoundation.org/wiki/Frequently_Asked_ 
Questions (last modified May 24, 2011).  Wikimedia was incorporated in the state of Florida on June 20, 2003, 
after which Wikipedia founder Jimmy Wales transferred ownership of all Wikipedia and Nupedia (the original 
version of Wikipedia) domain names and associated copyrighted materials to Wikimedia.  See Articles of 
Incorporation of Wikimedia Foundation, Inc. (June 20, 2003), available at http://sunbiz.org/pdf/\9003936.pdf; 
see also Jimmy Wales, Post to Announcing Wikimedia Foundation, WIKIMEDIA FOUND. (June 20, 2003, 4:18 
PM), http://lists.wikimedia.org/pipermail/wikipedia-l/2003-June/010743.html (announcing formation of 
Wikimedia Foundation). 
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the main service of Wikimedia.201  One may use the services of Wikimedia 
simply by using Wikipedia in one of several languages.202  Or one may choose 
to participate even more in the organization, by authoring and editing articles. 
Wikimedia’s organizational structure manifests the importance of social 
identity to the character of the organization.  Wikimedia is overseen by a board 
of trustees, which manages the organization and oversees the solicitation and 
distribution of funds.  Wikimedia also employs a small staff, which runs the 
organization’s day-to-day affairs.203  Different communities support 
Wikimedia’s projects by organizing individual webpages, structuring 
navigation between pages, resolving conflicts between community members, 
and creating their own rules and guidelines of behavior.204  Wikimedia’s 
bylaws provide that all community members can participate in the life of the 
 
 201 Wikipedia’s website describes: 
Wikipedia is written collaboratively by largely anonymous Internet volunteers . . . . 
. . . . 
Since its creation in 2001, Wikipedia has grown rapidly into one of the largest reference 
Web sites, attracting nearly 78 million visitors monthly as of January 2010.  There are more than 
91,000 active contributors working on more than 17,000,000 articles in more than 270 languages.  
As of today, there are 3,604,800 articles in English.  Every day, hundreds of thousands of visitors 
from around the world collectively make tens of thousands of edits and create thousands of new 
articles to augment the knowledge held by the Wikipedia encyclopedia. 
Wikipedia: About, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:About (last modified May 18, 2011). 
 202 Wikimedia collaborates with an international network of chapters to provide the infrastructure and 
organization for the development and maintenance of Wikipedia and other wiki projects.  Other collaborative 
wiki projects include: WIKTIONARY, http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/Wiktionary:Main_Page (last modified Apr. 
26, 2011) (dictionary and thesaurus); WIKIQUOTE, http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Main_Page (last modified Mar. 
7, 2011) (compendium of quotations from people and creative works in every language); WIKIBOOKS, 
http://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/Main_Page (last visited May 28, 2011) (free textbooks and manuals that anyone 
can edit); WIKISOURCE, http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Main_Page (last modified May 8, 2011) (online library 
of free content publications collected and maintained by the community); WIKIMEDIA COMMONS, 
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Main_Page (last modified Apr. 14, 2011) (free media repository 
containing millions of media files); WIKISPECIES, http://species.wikimedia.org/wiki/Main_Page (last modified 
Mar. 28, 2011) (directory of species of all forms of life); WIKINEWS, http://en.wikinews.org/wiki/Main_Page 
(last visited May 28, 2011) (free content news provided by volunteers seeking to present reliable, unbiased, 
and entertaining news); WIKIVERSITY, http://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Wikiversity:Main_Page (last modified 
Dec. 4, 2010) (project devoted to the provision of learning resources for levels stretching from preschool to 
university, including professional training and informal, free learning materials and activities); and META-
WIKI, http://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Main_Page (last modified May 25, 2011) (Wikimedia project 
coordination).  See generally WIKIMEDIA FOUND., http://wikimediafoundation.org/wiki/Home (last modified 
May 20, 2011). 
 203 Wikimedia Foundation, WIKIPEDIA, http://wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Foundation (last modified 
May 26, 2011). 
 204 The Wikipedia Community, META-WIKI, http://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/The_Wikipedia_Community 
(last modified Jan. 21, 2011). 
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organization by voting via electronic means if necessary.205  Proxy voting is 
not allowed.206 
Most strikingly, the organization places an especially high premium on 
participation in the form of authoring or editing pages.  Indeed, eligibility to 
vote for the Wikimedia board is measured by this form of participation in the 
organization, not by status or even by donation.  For example, in order to vote 
in Wikimedia’s 2009 election, users had to have completed at least 600 edits 
prior to June 1, 2009, and at least 50 edits between January 1 and July 1, 
2009.207 
What makes Wikimedia remarkable is that its managerial structure rewards 
those who most closely identify with the organization and who demonstrate 
that identity not by donating money, but by participating in the warm-glow 
creation of the organization in a quantifiable way.  If Wikimedia were a for-
profit organization it could not exist; the knowledge that the owners were 
profiting from the labor of the volunteers would dampen their editorial zeal 
and dim the glow of participating in the organization. 
3. Foundations 
Among the charitable foundations grouped under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal 
Revenue Code are private or independent foundations and public charities.208  
Independent foundations receive substantially all of their contributions from 
relatively few sources and often rely on investment earnings as their source of 
ongoing support.209  About 100,000 private foundations exist in the United 
States, most of which make grants to fund 501(c)(3) public charities.210  Total 
 
 205 Wikimedia Foundation, Inc., By-Laws, art. IV § 10 (2010), available at http://wikimediafoundation. 
org/wiki/Wikimedia_Foundation_bylaws. 
 206 Id. 
 207 Board Elections: 2009, WIKIMEDIA FOUND., http://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Board_elections/2009/en 
(last modified May 2, 2011). 
 208 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. 4220, APPLYING FOR 501(C)(3) TAX-EXEMPT STATUS 5 (2009), 
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p4220.pdf; see also International Grantmaking Basics, U.S. INT’L 
GRANTMAKING, http://www.usig.org/legal/Types-of-gm-orgs.asp (last visited May 28, 2011) (“U.S. tax law 
effectively divides charities into two categories: public charities and private foundations.  Although treated 
differently for some regulatory purposes, both public charities and private foundations are exempt from 
income tax under Section 501(c)(3) of the U.S. Tax Code.”). 
 209 In contrast, public charities must have broad public support.  INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 
208, at 5 (“Generally, a public charity has a broad base of support while a private foundation has very limited 
sources of support.”). 
 210 501(c)(3) Private Foundations, NAT’L CTR. FOR CHARITABLE STATISTICS, http://nccsdataweb.urban. 
org/PubApps/nonprofit-overview-segment.php?t=pf (last visited May 28, 2011). 
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revenues of private foundations reporting to the IRS were $173.8 billion in 
2008, and total assets were $569.9 billion.211  Prominent examples of private 
foundations include the Rockefeller Foundation, Ford Foundation, and the 
Gates Foundation. 
Foundations are in a sense the epitome of nonprofits serving an identity 
function.  Wealthy individuals sometimes create foundations for prestige 
reasons, of course (otherwise they could just give anonymously to the cause of 
their choice), but it is the specific kind of prestige associated with creating a 
nonprofit that fulfills the founders’ goals.  Founders often do remain involved 
with their foundations’ business, investments, and charitable work, as the 
involvement of Bill and Melinda Gates in the Gates Foundation demonstrates.  
However, as foundations become more removed from their founders, the 
foundations’ contributions may become less about the identity of the 
organization.212  Some time after their inception, and certainly by the third or 
fourth decade, many foundations begin to make grants through an institutional 
process that has relatively little to do with identity formation.  In general, then, 
we can say that the identity function is strong for foundations’ founders and 
likely diminishes as time goes on. 
C. Trade Associations and Social Clubs 
Associations exist to promote common interests.  The point of the 
association is to allow individuals to interact and benefit from each other so 
that income is tax exempt,213 although there is no tax benefit to donating.  
Sometimes the goal of associations is to maximize profits at the member level 
and not at the entity level.  Organizations as diverse as the National Football 
League214 and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce215 are examples.  Under 
 
 211 Id. 
 212 Indeed, as noted above, some founders take drastic steps to ensure that the identity of foundation is not 
diminished.  For a discussion of the Olin Foundation, for instance, see supra text accompanying note 61. 
 213 Under I.R.C. § 501(c)(4), (6), or (7). 
 214 The National Football League (NFL) is an association of thirty-two United States professional football 
teams.  Constitution and Bylaws of the Nat’l Football League, art. III § 1 (2006), available at http://static. 
nfl.com/static/content//public/static/html/careers/pdf/co_.pdf.  The main purpose of the NFL is “[t]o promote 
and foster the primary business of League members, each member being an owner of a professional football 
club located in the United States,” and the “League is not organized nor to be operated for profit.”  Id. art. II 
§§ 1(A), 2. 
 215 The IRS describes chambers of commerce as “composed of the merchants and traders of a city,” and 
treats them as “business leagues” under § 501(c)(6).  INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. 557, TAX-EXEMPT 
STATUS FOR YOUR ORGANIZATION 47 (2010), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p557.pdf.  For 
example, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce is a tax-exempt organization under § 501(c)(6).  Frequently Asked 
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§ 501(c)(6), they are exempt from federal income taxation, but association fees 
are not deductible from a member’s income. 
Fraternities and sororities216 are exempt organizations classified as social 
clubs under § 501(c)(7).217  They focus not on making money, but on purely 
associational value, that is, the utility derived by each member from being in 
an association with certain other individuals.218  These organizations, too, 
enjoy an exemption from federal taxation on income (with an exception for 
unrelated business income, which is taxable219).  Again, conceptually these 
entities must be nonprofits because (whatever other ends they may serve220) 
their focus is social and identity driven.  Imagining a for-profit sorority is 
difficult.  The goods the sorority promises its initiates—sisterhood, friendship, 
and other intangibles—are not considered goods that can or should be 
purchased.  Were a for-profit entity to purport to provide them, the for-profit 
motive would reduce the sorority’s ability to claim any distinctness of identity, 
except association with those willing to pay a certain amount of money.  
Cynics might say that sorority membership concerns only exclusivity, 
networking opportunities, and access to attractive friends or prospective mates.  
But even assuming that the cynic is correct, the promise of these would be 
diminished if provided by an entity with a for-profit motive.221  In particular, 
 
Questions, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, http://www.uschamber.com/about/faqs#19 (last visited Apr. 4, 
2011). 
 216 The North-American Interfraternity Conference lists the following as benefits offered by fraternity 
participation: “lifelong friends, leadership opportunities, social and sports activities, academic support and 
excellence, and networking opportunities.”  FAQs, FRATERNITYINFO.COM, http://www.fraternityinfo.com/faqs 
(last visited May 28, 2011).  Likewise, the National Panhellenic Conference, which supports its twenty-six 
member international sororities, promises potential sorority members personal and professional support, 
enhanced academic achievement, and lifelong friends.  Potential New Members, NAT’L PANHELLENIC 
CONFERENCE, http://www.npcwomen.org/undergrads.aspx (last visited May 28, 2011). 
 217 Mark D. Bauer, Small Liberal Arts Colleges, Fraternities, and Antitrust: Rethinking Hamilton College, 
53 CATH. U. L. REV. 347, 356–57 (2004); see also I.R.C. § 501(c)(7) (2006). 
 218 See Henry Hansmann, Higher Education as an Associative Good, in FORUM FUTURES 1999, at 11, 11 
(Maureen Devlin & Joel Meyerson eds., 1999), available at http://net.educause.edu/ir/library/pdf/ffp9901.pdf 
(describing an associative good as one where “a consumer is interested not just in the quality and price of the 
firm’s products, but also in the personal characteristics of the firm’s other customers”). 
 219 “Unrelated business taxable income” is defined in I.R.C. § 512(a). 
 220 See Robert M. Jarvis, Book Review, 37 J.L. & EDUC. 605, 607 (2008) (reviewing ALAN D. DESANTIS, 
INSIDE GREEK U.: FRATERNITIES, SORORITIES, AND THE PURSUIT OF PLEASURE, POWER, AND PRESTIGE (2007)) 
(characterizing the organizations’ members as concerned primarily with sex). 
 221 In contrast, viewed only through a tax lens, these organizations have no real existence as a separate 
entity.  One court justified fraternities’ exempt status merely on the grounds of avoidance of double taxation: 
Congress has determined that in a situation where individuals have banded together to provide 
recreational facilities on a mutual basis, it would be conceptually erroneous to impose a tax on 
the organization as a separate entity.  The funds exempted are received only from the members 
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claims of exclusivity or rigorous selection criteria would be less credible 
because of knowledge on the part of the consumer that the organizer was 
driven by profit. 
D. Religious Organizations 
Churches and other religious organizations are among the most dominant 
forms of nonprofit enterprise in the United States, with a combined annual 
revenue of approximately $100.95 billion.222  Religious belief is a core aspect 
of social identity, as well as a source of individual well-being.223  Like national 
identity, one’s religious beliefs provide a sense of meaning, belonging, and 
purposeful existence.  While formerly church membership was principally 
driven by which denomination’s building happened to be local, believers are 
now subdividing into smaller and smaller homogeneous groups.224  That is, 
there is now a “competitive religious marketplace,”225 and in at least some 
locations, religious communities are run more or less like businesses.226 
Even so, one important aspect of religious community is the sense of social 
belonging.227  Religion is a characteristic that markedly distinguishes an 
individual from others and thus is considered highly salient to personal 
identity.228  The more salient an identity characteristic, the greater its potential 
to affect well-being; thus, there is motive to choose a church or religious 
 
and any “profit” which results from overcharging for the use of the facilities still belongs to the 
same members.  No income of the sort usually taxed has been generated; the money has simply 
been shifted from one pocket to another, both within the same pair of pants. 
McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 458 (D.D.C. 1972).  While accurate from an economic standpoint, 
the description fails to adequately capture why fraternities are not merely exempt, but also nonprofit. 
 222 CTR. ON PHILANTHROPY AT IND. UNIV., GIVING USA 2010: THE ANNUAL REPORT ON PHILANTHROPY 
FOR THE YEAR 2009, at 12 fig. (2010), available at http://www.communityfoundationcbr.org/assets/docs/ 
Giving_USA_report_2010.pdf. 
 223 Marta Elliott & R. David Hayward, Religion and Well-Being in a Church Without a Creed, 10 
MENTAL HEALTH RELIGION & CULTURE 109, 109 (2007). 
 224 Vincent J. Miller, Where Is the Church? Globalization and Catholicity, 69 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 412, 
419, 426 (2008) (noting change from “simple inertia of social space”). 
 225 Paul Moses, The Pope in America: The Pope’s Challenge, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Apr. 13, 2008, at A6. 
 226 See generally Nanlai Cao, Boss Christians: The Business of Religion in the “Wenzhou Model” of 
Christian Revival, CHINA J., Jan. 2008, at 63 (noting entrepreneurial model of church formation). 
 227 Christian Smith, Why Christianity Works: An Emotions-Focused Phenomenological Account, 68 SOC. 
RELIGION 165, 176 (2007) (“Some Christians literally order their entire schedules and activities around the 
social and spiritual lives of their churches.”). 
 228 Tom W. Smith, Social Identity and Socio-Demographic Structure, 19 INT’L J. PUB. OPINION RES. 380, 
381 (2007) (reporting survey finding religion third most salient identity characteristic, behind family and 
occupation). 
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organization with which one identifies strongly.229  Even members of a church 
without a creed, such as Unitarian Universalists, derive great strength and 
comfort from their religion if it is central to their identities.230 
The benefits of religion include spiritual experience, social support, a sense 
of identity and belonging, and a framework for dealing with existential 
questions.231  These attributes are simply inconsistent with a profit motive.  It 
is unlikely that a congregant would derive a satisfactory spiritual experience or 
a sense of deep belonging from a church that sought primarily to make money 
or to advance the earthly interests of its owners.  And it is difficult to imagine 
that a congregant would feel socially supported by a church that charged 
market rates for spiritual counseling or participation in group activities.  The 
concept of a for-profit church is incoherent because what churches purport to 
offer is incompatible with maximizing profits. 
E. Hybrids: The University Example 
Colleges and universities are nonprofit institutions that have both service-
providing and donative characteristics.  For prospective students (and their 
parents, who sometimes foot the bill), universities provide a service that 
involves both the delivery of education and the provision of credentials.  
Credentialing is a function both of the degree attained (e.g., Ph.D. versus B.A.) 
and the level of the institution’s reputation (e.g., Harvard University versus a 
highly localized college).  Universities generally market to students based on 
the excellence of their faculties, the attractiveness of their facilities, and the 
opportunities they provide graduates.  Students compare universities based on 
these attributes, competitiveness in admissions, and a host of intangibles.  The 
identity character of the institution, while important, seems less salient to this 
population. 
In contrast, when universities market to potential donors—chiefly alumni—
social identity becomes highly important.  Few organizations in an individual’s 
life shape one’s identity as profoundly as one’s undergraduate institution.  
Alumni donors give to their alma maters to participate fully in that identity.  
Alumni are reminded (some might say hounded) about what their college years 
 
 229 Elliott & Hayward, supra note 223, at 111. 
 230 Id. at 122. 
 231 Id. at 110. 
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meant to them,232 and of their almost moral obligation to give back, so as to 
participate in the life of the school.233 
To be sure, for-profit educational institutions exist.  But contrasting for-
profit colleges with their nonprofit counterparts highlights the identity function 
of the nonprofit form.  Just as SiriusXM sells a product different from public 
radio, for-profit institutions of higher education are selling a kind of good 
fundamentally different from that offered by nonprofit institutions. 
For-profit colleges and universities tend to focus on narrow, practical skills 
and frequently cast themselves as technical training schools (e.g., ITT 
Technical Institute234).  Advocates of for-profit education argue these 
universities are making education more accessible to all types of people.  Other 
proponents value being viewed as customers rather than students because they 
believe it leads to a more responsive instructional environment.  The profit 
motive also requires that these schools innovate and improve to maintain and 
increase their customer base.  This leads to flexibility for both the university 
and its customers, allowing convenient learning at a student’s own pace.235 
Proponents suggest that for-profit education is a desirable result of 
competition, leading to the most efficient outcome: highest quality at lowest 
price.236  On the other hand, one of the criticisms of for-profit charter schools 
 
 232 Indeed, Hansmann concludes that college tuition represents a loan program with a “voluntary 
payback”—in the form of alumni donations.  Hansmann, supra note 22, at 861.  Higher education is a good 
investment, but practical problems keep the loan market from being efficient.  Hansmann cites: (1) the moral 
hazard problem of individuals not working hard enough to pay back the loan; (2) legal restraints on personal 
servitude that prevent the lender from “foreclosing” on the borrower’s labor; and (3) the long-term nature of a 
loan that would optimally pay out during a borrower’s peak earning years, which occur sometimes thirty years 
after the loan’s origin.  Id.  While Hansmann is right that the rhetoric of “giving back” has a moral cast, his 
implicit loan characterization seems strained.  If the relationship were truly an implicit loan, then universities 
would spend more time and money during an undergraduate’s career emphasizing that tuition does not pay for 
services, and that there is a duty—albeit a moral duty—to pay for future students. 
 233 Id. (“Of course, there is no legally enforceable obligation to pay anything to the school once an 
individual has graduated, and many alumni give nothing.  But the schools constantly remind alumni of their 
moral obligation, and many alumni do give.”). 
 234 From its website: “At ITT Technical Institute[], we are committed to helping men and women develop 
the skills and knowledge to pursue many opportunities in today’s fastest growing career fields, including 
electronics, web development, computer programming, computer networking, computer drafting and design, 
criminal justice, business and health sciences.”  ITT TECHNICAL INST., http://www.itt-tech.edu (last visited 
May 28, 2011). 
 235 See For-Profit vs. Nonprofit Online Schools, ALL ONLINE SCHOOLS, http://www.allonlineschools.com/ 
online-education-resource-center/online-degrees-101-online-school-differences (last visited May 28, 2011). 
 236 See, e.g., Cynthia D. Hill & David M. Welsch, For-Profit Versus Not-for-Profit Charter Schools: An 
Examination of Michigan Student Test Scores, 17 EDUC. ECON. 147 (2009). 
RODRIGUES GALLEYSFINAL 6/29/2011  11:42 AM 
1308 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 60 
is that they divert funding meant for education to maintain profits.237  Viewing 
students as customers also has negatives.  Admissions are focused on bringing 
in dollars, not on selecting students who will actually be able to complete their 
degrees.  As Hansmann points out, students might not be the best judges of 
quality of education;238 indeed, some educational benefits might not be obvious 
to the consumer.  This explains why, although for-profit universities like the 
University of Phoenix,239 American InterContinental University,240 Chancellor 
University,241 DeVry University,242 and Strayer University243 have been 
 
 237 Id. 
 238 Hansmann, supra note 22, at 866. 
 239 University of Phoenix offers undergraduate and graduate programs in business, education, nursing, 
technology, and human services.  It offers evening classes, flexible scheduling, continuous enrollment, a 
student-centered environment, practitioner faculty, online classes, an online library, ebooks, and computer 
simulations.  It is the largest private university in North America.  It is accredited by the Higher Learning 
Commission and is a member of the North Central Association.  See generally UNIV. OF PHX., http://www. 
phoenix.edu (last visited May 28, 2011).  It is controlled by the Apollo Group, Inc., based in Arizona.  See 
generally Apollo Group, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Oct. 21, 2010). 
 240 American InterContinental University, established in 1970, offers Associate’s, Bachelor’s, and 
Master’s degree programs in Atlanta, Houston, London, Los Angeles, South Florida, and online.  It is 
accredited by the Higher Learning Commission and a member of the North Central Association.  It has a 
twelve-member governing board and is owned by the Career Education Corporation.  See generally AM. 
INTERCONTINENTAL UNIV., http://www.aiuniv.edu (last visited May 28, 2011); Career Education Corporation, 
Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 22, 2011). 
 241 Chancellor University offers Bachelor’s, Associate’s, graduate-degree, and certificate programs.  It 
was founded after Michael Clifford bought Myers University out of bankruptcy, turning a nonprofit institution 
into a for-profit institution.  Paul Glader, The Jack Welch MBA Coming to Web, WALL ST. J., June 22, 2009, at 
B1; see also Chancellor University System, LLC, Notice of Exempt Offering of Securities (Temporary Form 
D) (Mar. 12, 2009).  Since this conversion, Jack Welch, Noel Tichy, and George Kidd, Jr. joined the 
institution.  Jack Welch Hooks Up with Chancellor University of Ohio, CRAIN’S CLEVELAND BUS. (June 22, 
2009, 11:23 AM), http://www.crainscleveland.com/article/20090622/FREE/906229963/0/TOC.  It is marketed 
as an education with 160 years of experience with alumni such as John D. Rockefeller, Harvey Firestone, and 
Theodore Ernst.  See generally CHANCELLOR UNIV., http://www.chancelloru.edu (last visited May 28, 2011). 
 242 DeVry University, accredited by the Higher Learning Commission and a member of the North Central 
Association, has over ninety locations across the United States and Canada.  It is owned and operated by 
DeVry, Inc.  See generally DEVRY UNIV., http://www.devry.edu (last visited May 28, 2011).  For public 
filings, see SEC Filings, DEVRY UNIV., http://www.investors.devry.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=93880&p=irol-sec 
(last visited May 28, 2011). 
 243 Strayer University has eighty-seven campus locations across the United States and also offers classes 
online.  The average age of a Strayer student is thirty-four.  It has been educating since 1892 and advertises 
four qualities: affordability, convenience, quality, and support.  “Affordability” means offering a wide range of 
tuition options and scholarships.  “Convenience” means flexible classes, “convenient” campuses, and online 
classes.  “Quality” means accreditation by the Middle States Commission on Higher Education, approval and 
licensing by state education boards, and offering education programs for veterans, handicapped, and 
international students.  “Support” means its administrative support staff: an admissions office, academic 
advisors, a business office, a learning resources center, and a career development center.  The degrees offered 
are an Undergraduate Certificate, Undergraduate Diploma, Associate in Arts, Bachelor of Business 
Administration, Bachelor of Science, Master of Business Administration, Master of Education, Master of 
Health Services Administration, Master of Public Administration, Master of Science, and Executive Graduate 
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successful, as measured both in terms of returns for their investors and in 
enrollment, their courses of study, marketing, and student bodies do not place 
them in competition with the traditional undergraduate institution.  Students do 
not enroll at DeVry seeking the associative good of interacting with students 
and alumni of a certain caliber.  They enroll in order to learn a vocation.244 
Most universities are nonprofits because not seeking profits is central to a 
traditional university’s mission and identity.  In seeking tuition revenue, 
nonprofit schools do compete with regard to such matters as facilities offered, 
quality of faculty, after-graduation employment rates, and the like.  But alumni 
give to these institutions because of the identity they imbue: education as an 
unquantifiable good, part of the humanistic tradition from which our higher 
educational system stems.  Having profit-focused owners alters the value of 
this educational identity.  Comparison with for-profit higher education thus 
highlights the identity function the nonprofit form can provide. 
F. Cooperatives 
The nonprofit form is not the only one that can create a distinctive identity; 
cooperatives can as well.245  Although cooperatives get little publicity or 
scholarly attention, they have been around since our country’s founding246 and 
play a substantial role in our economy.  As of 2009, 47,000 cooperatives 
operated in this country, serving close to 120 million members.247  One 
hundred cooperatives individually generated at least $346 million in revenue in 
2002, and together the top 100 generated $119 billion in 2002248 and $170 
billion in 2007.249  Names like Sunkist, Ocean Spray, Land O’Lakes, and REI 
 
Certificate.  See generally About Strayer University, STRAYER UNIV., http://www.strayer.edu/about (last 
visited May 28, 2011); Strayer Education, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 22, 2011). 
 244 Katherine Yung, Dealing in Diplomas, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 29, 2004, at 1D (“[T]he 
university offers a growing array of year-round bachelor’s, master’s and doctoral degree programs in popular 
fields such as business, health care, education and information technology.  You won’t find geology or 
political science majors at this school.”). 
 245 Family-owned businesses and some public corporations, such as Berkshire Hathaway, can create a 
distinctive identity as well.  See discussion supra Part III.E. 
 246 Benjamin Franklin helped found an early fire insurance co-op, the Philadelphia Contributorship for the 
Insurance of Homes from Loss of Fire, in 1752, and it is still in operation today.  CHARLES T. AUTRY & 
ROLAND F. HALL, THE LAW OF COOPERATIVES 12 (2009). 
 247 Id. at 4. 
 248 KIMBERLY A. ZEULI & ROBERT CROPP, COOPERATIVES: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY 3 (2004). 
 249 AUTRY & HALL, supra note 246, at 4. 
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are familiar to many consumers who might not identify these companies with 
the granola-hawking food cooperative in their hometown. 
Cooperatives,250 unlike nonprofits, are usually for-profit businesses.251  Yet 
they resemble nonprofits in important ways.252  Cooperatives concentrate on 
maximizing the benefit to the customers and users that control them—in other 
words, the focus is on owner wealth maximization, not wealth maximization at 
the entity level.  “[T]his difference in orientation and objectives creates the 
biggest distinction between cooperatives and other corporations.  Cooperative 
members may or may not believe that profit maximization is the best goal for 
their cooperative.”253 
The point is not to make money at the entity level, but rather to maximize 
gain to individual users.  User power and control is emphasized, and a key 
characteristic of the form is democratic control, defined as one member/one 
vote, rather than as one share/one vote.  But members are comfortable with a 
for-profit entity as long as the entity’s understood purpose is maximizing the 
wealth of the users.  Just as it is contradictory for nonprofits to pay outsized 
bonuses to employees, so it would be incoherent for a cooperative to amass 
cash at the entity level or to spend capital on fancy offices.  While it may be a 
for-profit entity, it exists to assist and give back to its users, generally in 
proportion to their use.  This focus gives cooperatives a unique identity based 
in furthering the ends of their owners and users. 
 
 250 This section describes the traditional cooperative.  Relatively recently, “new generation” cooperatives 
have emerged, helped by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), 
which developed a uniform law in 2007, the Uniform Limited Cooperative Association Act.  These 
cooperatives require substantial equity investment from members, have contractually fixed delivery rights and 
obligations, a closed membership (i.e., a limited number of shares), and fewer restrictions on transferability, 
meaning shares have a market value that fluctuates.  Id. at 20–22. 
 251 In some ways, cooperatives are not an entity form per se, in that they can be incorporated under 
general incorporation law, nonprofit law, or LLC law.  Id. at 37.  Some are organized under separate 
cooperative statutes.  Martha W. Jordan, Are Tenant-Stockholders Entitled to a Charitable Contribution 
Deduction When a Cooperative Housing Corporation Donates a Preservation Easement?, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 
515, 520 (2009).  Most, however, take the corporate form.  Id. at 519.  Cooperatives may be stock or nonstock 
in form.  AUTRY & HALL, supra note 246, at 71.  Nonstock cooperatives distribute membership certificates but 
no dividends.  Id. at 71, 74.  For the purposes of this discussion, I treat the forms as indistinguishable. 
 252 Two common definitions of cooperatives are: “an autonomous association of persons united 
voluntarily to meet their common economic, social, and cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly owned 
and democratically controlled enterprise,” ZEULI & CROPP, supra note 248, at 1 (providing the International 
Co-operative Alliance definition); and “a user-owned, user-controlled business that distributes benefits on the 
basis of use,” AUTRY & HALL, supra note 246, at 8 (providing the USDA definition). 
 253 ZEULI & CROPP, supra note 248, at 43 (emphasis added). 
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This Part has provided a typology of nonprofit entities.  Service providers 
such as hospitals or organizations such as Consumers Union compete today 
largely on the basis of the services they provide.  They generally do not 
provide identity benefits.  The nonprofit status of hospitals, in particular, may 
be a holdover from the past when these organizations did provide an identity 
function, and religious hospitals may still retain that identity because of the 
meaning the religious affiliation brings.  Donative organizations, in contrast, 
rely not on the sale of services but rather on outside donations.  Organizations 
as varied as the Green Bay Packers, Wikimedia, and charitable foundations 
rely on donations, and much of what they “sell”—that is, provide—in 
exchange is a social identity.  Trade associations and clubs similarly traffic 
heavily in identity; their nonprofit status is crucial to their ability to credibly 
offer a good that is essentially the pleasure of associating with other like-
minded individuals.  Because of the centrality of faith to many individuals, 
religious organizations are perhaps the prototypical identity organization.  
Imagining a for-profit church crystallizes the importance of the nonprofit form 
in providing distinct social identity.  Universities are both service providers 
and donative nonprofits.  When marketing to students, they emphasize the 
superior nature of their services, but when marketing to alumni, they 
emphasize the special identity characteristics—sports teams, religious 
affiliation, shared experiences—that encourage giving.  While for-profit 
universities do exist, they compete for students solely based on the services 
they provide because they are not in the identity business.  Traditional 
universities, which are very much about identity creation, cannot take the for-
profit form because to do so would undermine their ability to provide a 
university identity based on shared values or experiences.  Finally, the case of 
cooperatives illustrates that forms other than the nonprofit can create a 
distinctive identity. 
V. IMPLICATIONS 
A. The Solution to the “Nonprofit Puzzle” 
Part I of this Article articulated the nonprofit puzzle.  Agency costs should 
be rampant within nonprofits, given the lack of traditional curbs.  But if agency 
costs were indeed severe it seems unlikely that individuals would participate in 
nonprofits.  The leading theory posits that nonprofits exist because of contract 
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failure.254  Applying Hansmann’s theory, nonprofit hospitals and nursing 
homes should make their status clear to potential customers to signal why the 
contract-failure risk is less acute, as compared to their for-profit rivals.  Yet 
empirical research suggests that they do not.  Furthermore, Hansmann’s 
contract failure theory fails to address the nonprofit puzzle.  He does, however, 
acknowledge that agency costs undermine the nonprofit form’s effectiveness as 
a response to contract failure, i.e., the inability of the payer to trust that she is 
getting what she paid for.255  Still, he concludes that, despite limited policing 
mechanisms, agency costs are probably not widespread in the nonprofit sector 
due to a vaguely defined social norm mechanism.256 
In Hansmann’s account, then, the nonprofit form exists because of contract 
failure, policed by social norms.  This Article supplements Hansmann’s theory 
by specifying the mechanism for norm enforcement.  Firms that sell a certain 
kind of warm-glow, social-identity good must choose the nonprofit form.  The 
social identity function accounts for the success of the form despite the 
weakness of legal constraints.  It creates a reason to trust the organization that 
makes the contract-failure theory work.  This Article proposes that the 
mechanism that constrains agency costs is the social identity function of the 
form itself: If agency costs run too high, then the nonprofit organization cannot 
market a distinctive warm-glow good.  High salaries and other rent-seeking 
thus occur less often than we might expect in nonprofits because both firm 
outsiders and firm insiders understand that the organization is premised on a 
goal separate from the profit motive.257 
B. Tax Status 
As discussed in the Introduction, the tax exemptions enjoyed by the 
nonprofit form are under assault.  This Article shows that nonprofits have a 
purpose that transcends providing tax advantage: They can provide social 
 
 254 To be fair, Hansmann calls social clubs an exception to the contract failure theory.  See Hansmann, 
supra note 22, at 892–94. 
 255 Id. at 896. 
 256 Id. at 875 (“Such broad compliance with a poorly policed constraint is presumably due to adherence to 
social norms that reinforce the legal restraints on profiteering by conditioning individual behavior even when 
the legal constraints are unlikely to be enforced.”). 
 257 Put differently, one could characterize the nonprofit organizational form as a kind of credible 
commitment device, in that it constitutionally commits the organization to nonprofit ends.  Yet, as Part I 
discussed, the commitment on its own lacks credibility, given the risk of agency costs and lack of policing.  
What makes the commitment a truly credible one is the identity function nonprofits can create. 
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identity.  The nonprofit form itself contributes meaning that cannot be reduced 
to mere tax exemption. 
Accepting this premise allows us to view the tax-exempt question in a new 
light.  A social identity theory of nonprofits suggests that taxation is irrelevant 
to the purpose of nonprofits, or at least of certain nonprofits.  Suppose that for-
profits and nonprofits were taxed equally, as Malani and Posner suggest.258  
The social identity theory argues that at least some nonprofits—those that 
provide an identity function—would continue to exist.  Even if the tax code no 
longer provided a special incentive to donate to a nonprofit provider of health 
care to the indigent, for example—that is, even if the code provided for an 
equal deduction for donations to a for-profit that provided the same service, or 
did not allow a deduction for a donation to either group—some subset of 
donors would still favor the nonprofit because of the increased identity value 
that entity provides. 
The point also applies to nonprofits that do not enjoy the personal 
deduction.  For example, trade associations or sororities are exempt from 
taxation at the entity level, but association fees and other donations are not tax 
deductible to the donor.  Even if these organizations had to pay taxes, social 
identity forces would keep these organizations in the nonprofit sphere. 
A social identity theory of nonprofits is thus agnostic on the tax-exemption 
question.  However, the theory may suggest that a binary approach to taxation 
of nonprofits is inappropriate.  As discussed above, nonprofits are 
heterogeneous, and as a policy matter, some might warrant exempt status more 
than others.  If social identity has value, so that society desires to encourage its 
production, then perhaps nonprofit organizations that provide identity should 
be the only ones that qualify for favored tax treatment.  Conversely, if identity 
function is providing enough incentive for these organizations to exist, exempt 
status might be redundant, and therefore wasteful. 
One particular application of social identity theory concerns service 
providers, such as hospitals and daycares.  As we have seen, nonprofit 
providers of these services differ little from for-profit providers with regard to 
their provision of social identity to consumers.259  As a result, affording for-
profit and nonprofit service providers differing tax treatment may make little 
sense.  To be sure, society might want to encourage the operation of daycares 
 
 258 See supra notes 66–68 and accompanying text. 
 259 See discussion supra Part IV.A.1. 
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and hospitals; if that is the case, however, there seems to be little reason to 
encourage the creation of such institutions only when they take the nonprofit 
form. 
C. The L3C 
The identity theory of nonprofits also offers insight into a new form.  Tax 
lawyers and their clients are still exploring the implications of a brand new 
form of entity, the low-profit limited liability company (L3C).  L3C statutes 
have been adopted in eight states (the first, Vermont, only in 2008), and 
numerous other states are considering them.260  Their history provides a 
remarkable case study of tax law shaping organizational design. 
The motivation behind the L3C form stems from the tax treatment of 
foundations.261  Total revenues of private foundations reporting to the IRS 
were $173.8 billion in 2008, and total assets were $569.9 billion.262  
Foundations are in something of a bind: They are required to spend 5% of their 
assets in order to maintain their exempt status,263 yet they also want to preserve 
capital and perhaps even grow it to provide for future needs.  The Internal 
Revenue Code penalizes private foundations that make investments that 
jeopardize the accomplishment of their exempt purposes, but allows private 
foundations to make program-related investments (PRIs).264  To qualify: (1) 
the primary purpose of the investment must be to accomplish a foundation’s 
exempt purpose; (2) no significant purpose of the investment can be the 
production of income or the appreciation of property; and (3) no purpose of the 
investment can be to electioneer, and only limited lobbying is permitted.265  
PRIs permit foundations to garner some financial return and count toward their 
5% annual distribution requirement.266 
 
 260 Bishop, supra note 31, at 246–47 & nn.2–3; J. William Callison, LC3s: Useless Gadgets?, BUS. L. 
TODAY, Nov.–Dec. 2009, at 55, 55; Daniel S. Kleinberger, A Myth Deconstructed: The “Emperor’s New 
Clothes” on the Low-Profit Limited Liability Company, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 879, 880 & nn.1–2 (2010). 
 261 Bishop, supra note 31, at 244. 
 262 501(c)(3) Private Foundations, supra note 210. 
 263 The tax regulations contain instructions for valuation of the investment assets.  For example, a 
foundation must use the average of the monthly values of publicly traded securities held during the year.  
BRUCE R. HOPKINS & JODY BLAZEK, PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS: TAX LAW AND COMPLIANCE 358 (2d ed. 2003). 
 264 I.R.C. § 4944 (2006). 
 265 Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3(a)(1)(i)–(iii) (1972). 
 266 I.R.C. § 4942. 
The assets against which the five percent is measured include the foundation’s investment assets, 
but not program-related investments or other assets that are used directly in carrying out the 
foundation’s charitable mission.  For example, if the foundation owns the building that houses its 
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The problem with PRIs is that uncertainty surrounds whether a given 
investment will qualify for the exception.  A foundation first must carefully 
plan a PRI and either hope that its investment will not be challenged or seek a 
preinvestment private letter ruling from the IRS, a lengthy and costly 
process.267  Claiming a PRI where none exists renders the foundation 
vulnerable to “toxic” excise taxes that run from 10% to 25%.268  For this 
reason, private foundations have generally been reluctant to engage in PRIs. 
Recently social entrepreneurs have promoted L3Cs as a way to unlock the 
potential of PRIs.  The future of L3Cs remains uncertain,269 but what is 
remarkable for the purpose of this Article is that the form was specifically 
created to track the language of the PRI requirements.270  Notably, the L3C 
 
offices, the value of the building is excluded from the five percent calculation to the extent the 
building is used directly for charitable activities and related administrative functions. 
MINN. COUNCIL ON FOUNDS., WHAT EVERY GRANTMAKER SHOULD KNOW: FREQUENTLY ASKED LEGAL 
QUESTIONS 46 (2009), available at http://www.mcf.org/system/asset_manager_pdfs/0000/0069/wegsk_1_.pdf; 
see also David S. Chernoff, Legal Dimensions of International Grantmaking: Summer 2000: Program Related 
Investments, COUNCIL ON FOUNDS., http://www.cof.org/templates/content.cfm?ItemNumber=1278 (last visited 
May 28, 2011) (“As an added inducement for foundations to make program-related investments, the Code 
provides that the amount of the program-related investment reduces the asset base upon which the 5-percent 
annual distribution requirement is applied.  On the other side of the equation, any principal repayment of a 
program-related investment increases the foundation’s minimum distribution requirement for the year in which 
the repayment is received.”). 
 267 Thomas Kelley, Law and Choice of Entity on the Social Enterprise Frontier, 84 TUL. L. REV. 337, 356 
(2009). 
 268 Bishop, supra note 31, at 252–53. 
 269 Some view L3Cs as “dangerous” because they are unnecessary and suggest to donors a tax status that 
they do not (yet) have.  Callison, supra note 260, at 55–56.  Some proposed initiatives read the requirement of 
significantly furthering the accomplishment of a charitable or educational purpose very broadly, even to 
encompass publishing Illinois newspapers, bolstering North Carolina’s hard-hit furniture-manufacturing 
industry, and funding biotech startups.  See Mark Fitzgerald, Prophet Motives: Alternative Ownership Buzz 
Raises Flagging Hopes, PEORIA NEWSPAPER GUILD (Ill.) (Mar. 25, 2009), http:// 
peorianewspaperguild.org/includes/print.php?ID=6293 (noting efforts within newspaper industry to use L3C 
corporate structure); Heather Peeler, The L3C: A New Tool for Social Enterprise, COMMUNITY WEALTH 
VANGUARD (Aug. 2007), http://www.communitywealth.com/Newsletter/August 2007/L3C.html (noting use of 
L3C in North Carolina furniture industry); CHRIS LARSON, AM. CHEM. SOC’Y, L3C—THE NEXT GENERATION 
OF SMALL BIOTECH? (2008), available at http://www.americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/downloads/ 
ChrisLarsonNextGenBiotech.pdf (advocating use of L3C structure in biotech industry).  The author reads the 
charitable purpose in the latter two cases as the creation or preservation of jobs, but most for-profit businesses 
also strive to create or preserve jobs, at least as a by-product of doing business. 
 270 Vermont was the first state to authorize creation of the L3C.  Bishop, supra note 31, at 246.  Modeling 
its language after the PRI requirements, its legislation requires (among other things) that: 
(A) The company: (i) significantly furthers the accomplishment of one or more charitable or 
educational purposes within the meaning of Section 170(c)(2)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code 
of 1986, 26 U.S.C. § 170(c)(2)(B); and (ii) would not have been formed but for the company’s 
relationship to the accomplishment of charitable or educational purposes.  [And that:] (B) No 
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cannot be formed for the purpose of producing income or property appreciation 
(although the mere fact that the organization produces significant income does 
not mean that it necessarily violates this requirement).271 
Promoters behind the L3C envision a hybrid organization that permits 
several different tiers or tranches of investment.272  Assume, for example, the 
investment is in rehabilitating a historic building that has fallen into neglect, 
but which could provide attractive office space and banquet facilities if 
properly repaired.  The investment is one that is socially beneficial because of 
its historic preservation value and also could generate some investment returns, 
but not enough to make the investment viable on its own. 
The idea is that private foundations, interested in availing themselves of 
PRIs without going through the hassle of determining what qualifies as a PRI, 
could instead invest in junior tranches that would not receive a significant 
financial return.  Presumably any social enterprise that qualified for L3C status 
could offer investments that also qualified for the program-related investment 
exemption.273  That is, entity form is dictated and calculated to produce a 
desired tax result to particular investors. 
L3C promoters posit that the entity could also create additional tiers of 
membership.274  An intermediate ownership tier would target socially 
responsible investors who are looking to help the community and willing to 
accept a lower than market rate of return.275  Finally, the L3C could create a 




significant purpose of the company is the production of income or the appreciation of property; 
provided, however, that the fact that a person produces significant income or capital appreciation 
shall not, in the absence of other factors, be conclusive evidence of a significant purpose 
involving the production of income or the appreciation of property. 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27)(A)–(B) (2009); see also Kelley, supra note 267, at 372–73 (noting that the 
idea behind L3C was to “closely track” the language of program-related investment requirements set forth in 
I.R.C. § 4944(c)). 
 271 See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27)(B). 
 272 Kelley, supra note 267, at 373. 
 273 Id. 
 274 Id. at 373–74. 
 275 Id. at 373. 
 276 Id. at 374; see also Peeler, supra note 269. 
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Tranche Return 
Senior: banks, venture capital Market 
Middle: socially responsible investors Somewhat below market 
Junior: Private Foundations 1–2% 
For now it remains unclear whether the IRS will accept these new entities’ 
claims to qualify for the PRI exemption; in 2008, L3C advocates failed in their 
attempt to have legislation passed that would amend the Code’s PRI definition 
to match L3C structure.277  Critics call the L3C “incoherent,”278 a 
“perversion,”279 and a “myth.”280  Social identity theory provides further 
ground for skepticism about this emerging form. 
The L3C raises the intriguing possibility that a single for-profit entity could 
be different things to different investors.  Some may be looking for a market 
rate of return, while others may seek returns made up of both financial gain 
and social good.  As such, the L3C challenges the traditional conception of 
entity as a collection of individuals with a common purpose—be it to 
maximize profit (the for-profit corporation, LLC, or partnership), to maximize 
wealth at the user level (the cooperative), or to maximize benefits for society 
or members (the nonprofit).281 
The L3C as currently envisioned may be too much of a hybrid to claim to 
provide any identity benefits.  While the form’s vaunted purpose is to serve 
social ends, and it is not supposed to have as its purpose the production of 
income or the appreciation of property, the fact that some of its investors 
expect market rates of return may keep it from bestowing a sense of unique 
identity on its investors—and from achieving the very PRI status that 
supposedly drives it.282  On the other hand, as discussed above in Part IV.B, 
 
 277 The Program-Related Investment Promotion Act of 2008 would have amended § 4944(c) to provide a 
process for foundations to receive a determination that low-profit L3C investments qualify for the program-
related investment exemption.  Callison, supra note 260, at 55–56. 
 278 Larry Ribstein, The Nature of the L3C, TRUTH ON MARKET (June 17, 2010, 6:37 PM), http:// 
truthonthemarket.com/2010/06/17/the-nature-of-the-l3c. 
 279 Bishop, supra note 31, at 243. 
 280 Kleinberger, supra note 260. 
 281 Of course, investors at all firms may have heterogeneous motives: Investor A might choose to invest in 
Whole Foods because she thinks she will earn the maximum return for her capital, while Investor B might 
invest because he believes in the firm’s commitment to organic food.  But the entity as a whole seeks to make 
money. 
 282 As Kleinberger points out, typical L3C statutes require that “no significant purpose of the company 
[be] the production of income or the appreciation of property,” but the venture itself is premised on achieving a 
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foundations, the market for which the L3C form was specifically crafted, are 
probably less motivated to invest for reasons of identity than other donors.283  
The L3C planners certainly anticipate that the senior-level investors will be 
motivated by pursuit of market rates of return rather than any warm glow or 
identity benefits.  (If they were not so motivated, they would, presumably, 
accept less than a market rate of return.) 
The question then becomes whether the middle tranche of socially 
responsible investors will feel any identity benefits in contributing to a worthy 
for-profit and receiving a below-market rate of return, or whether instead the 
knowledge that fellow investors are receiving more than they are will vitiate 
the warm-glow, social identity possibilities offered by the organization as a 
whole.  Clearly individuals can derive some identity or warm-glow benefits 
from financial transactions and are willing to sacrifice financial gain to do so.  
For example, Kiva Microfunds is a nonprofit that facilitates loans to 
microfinance organizations.284  Its website allows individuals to make interest-
free loans to microfinance organizations that in turn make loans to individuals 
living in poverty.285  While Kiva itself is a nonprofit and fosters feelings of 
community among its lenders,286 its lenders are not donors: They make loans 
on the assumption that the principal will be returned to them.  They forgo 
interest on the money that they loan, but the IRS does not view this forgone 
interest as deductible, nor does Kiva itself.287 
The question of whether a slice of an organization can confer identity-
based warm glow is an intriguing one.  My guess is that it cannot.  I 
 
profit.  Kleinberger, supra note 260, at 908 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/1-
26(b)(1) (West Supp. 2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 283 Indeed, this Article has specifically set aside the donative activity of private foundations, which, due to 
their large size and sophisticated screening mechanisms, do not generally make donations for identity reasons. 
 284 Sarah B. Lawsky, Money for Nothing: Charitable Deductions for Microfinance Lenders, 61 SMU L. 
REV. 1525, 1526, 1536 (2008). 
 285 See How Kiva Works, KIVA, http://www.kiva.org/about/how (last visited May 28, 2011) (explaining 
how donation and lending processes work). 
 286 Prospective lenders evaluating a potential loan recipient can view the profiles of other Kiva lenders 
who have already lent to that individual.  To bolster this sense of community, Kiva has employed social 
networking and “Web 2.0” to develop “a community of passionate lenders.”  Lawsky, supra note 284, at 
1532–33 (“Kiva lenders have their own website, separate from Kiva, which, as the site itself explains, 
‘supports Kiva’s mission of “connecting people, through lending, for the sake of alleviating poverty,” by 
creating a place where Kiva community members can connect with one another.’  Kiva lenders also have their 
own MySpace page.” (footnote omitted) (quoting About Kiva Friends, KIVA FRIENDS, http://www.kivafriends. 
org/index.php?action=about (last visited May 28, 2011))). 
 287 While donations to the organization itself are tax deductible, the forgone interest on the loans is not.  
See generally id. (arguing that such forgone interest should be deductible). 
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hypothesize that the knowledge that fellow investors are making a profit would 
likely taint the social identity value of the investment.  It remains too early to 
know how the L3C will work in practice.  To the extent the public believes that 
some tax implications should flow from identity, it may feel that L3Cs are 
more or less deserving of qualifying for the PRI exemption. 
D. First Amendment Implications of a Social Identity Theory of Nonprofits 
The Supreme Court’s recent Citizens United288 decision reveals the 
importance of understanding identity’s role in business entities.  Citizens 
United is a nonprofit corporation that was prevented by the Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) from purchasing advertisements for 
Hillary: The Movie by the Federal Election Commission (FEC) in the thirty 
days prior to the last Democratic primary.289  Prior to Citizens United, First 
Amendment jurisprudence collapsed all corporations—with the exception of 
certain so-called MCFL290 ideological nonprofit corporations—into one 
category and regulated organizational speech accordingly.291  Corporations 
could not engage in “electioneering communication” within thirty days of a 
general election unless they were exempted under MCFL because they: (1) 
were “formed for the express purpose of promoting political ideas”; (2) had no 
shareholders; (3) were not founded by a for-profit corporation or labor union; 
and (4) did not accept contributions from such entities.292  Citizens United did 
not qualify under MCFL because for-profit corporations donated some of the 
funds used to make the movie.293 
Each of the five opinions in Citizens United grapples with the basic fact 
that the corporate house has many rooms; nonprofits, privately held businesses, 
and large public companies all take the corporate form.  Because the law draws 
a line between corporate and noncorporate speech, each authoring Justice in 
Citizens United focused attention on those corporations best suited to his 
argument.  For example, Justice Kennedy emphasized that bans on corporate 
speech apply to nonprofits and small, privately held for-profit corporations, 
 
 288 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 289 Id. at 887–88. 
 290 FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL), 479 U.S. 238 (1986). 
 291 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 891. 
 292 MCFL, 479 U.S. at 264.  The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) placed limits on 
political advertising thirty days before a general election and applied that restriction to all nonprofits, as well 
as for-profit corporations.  The Court in McConnell v. FEC interpreted the BCRA to retain the MCFL 
exemption.  McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 102–03 (2003). 
 293 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 891. 
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specifically invoking the Sierra Club, the National Rifle Association, and the 
American Civil Liberties Union.294  Making much the same point, Justice 
Scalia noted the impact on the Republican and Democratic parties.295  Justice 
Scalia described the speech of the Republican or Democratic Party as “the 
speech of many individual Americans, who have associated in a common 
cause, giving the leadership of the party the right to speak on their behalf.”296  
He concluded that “[t]he association of individuals in a business corporation is 
no different.”297  But it is in fact different.  Nonprofits can create a social 
identity in association, which for-profit corporations cannot.  In this vein 
Justice Stevens, writing in dissent, focused on publicly held corporations, with 
their “large war chests.”298  One of his key arguments, which focused on the 
protection of investors, only applies to for-profit corporations, and further, only 
to those for-profits that are publicly traded.299 
If nonprofit status can create and convey a distinct social identity, and if we 
value the freedom of individuals to speak in association, then perhaps there is a 
middle road between the MCFL exemption and opening the floodgates of 
corporate spending on the electorate.  If the First Amendment privileges 
speech rights and the right to speak in associations, it might also reasonably 
draw a line between organizations in which the associative or identity function 
is paramount—mostly nonprofits, but cooperatives and perhaps labor unions as 
well—and those in which it is not.  Put differently, and in the Citizens United 
majority’s terms, government may not discriminate on the basis of the identity 
of the political speaker—if it is coherent to claim that speaker has an identity in 
a constitutionally relevant sense.  And a constitutionally relevant identity might 
well be a social identity—an identity with meaning over and above 
agglomeration to pursue profit. 
This interpretation would greatly broaden the reach of the MCFL 
exemption.  Perhaps it is proper to subject § 501(c)(3) organizations to 
campaign-finance restrictions on the theory that they give up their ability to 
participate in campaigns in exchange for § 501(c)(3) status.  But this logic 
 
 294 Id. at 897. 
 295 Id. at 928 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 296 Id. 
 297 Id. 
 298 Id. at 966 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 299 Generally shareholders in privately held corporations have bargained for board representation or 
contractual rights that protect their interests.  Justice Stevens’s references to most Americans holding stock by 
means of pension funds and mutual funds and portfolio holdings suggest a focus on public corporations.  Id. at 
978. 
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would not extend to other § 501 organizations that might still make strong 
claims for First Amendment protections.  This would include not only 
501(c)(4) organizations, but also real estate boards, sororities, and trade 
associations such as the National Football League, the Chamber of Commerce, 
and labor unions.  Although sometimes made up of for-profit entities, at the 
organizational level these associations still have a coherent nonprofit identity 
and purpose. 
Indeed, Citizens United is itself a nonprofit corporation “dedicated to 
restoring our government to citizens’ control.”300  It qualifies for tax-exempt 
status under § 501(c)(4),301 which applies to “[c]ivic leagues or organizations 
not organized for profit but operated exclusively for the promotion of social 
welfare.”302  Section 501(c)(4) organizations, unlike § 501(c)(3) groups, can 
engage in lobbying or political campaigning.303  The Citizens United majority 
elected not to hold for Citizens United by the MCFL exemption,304 holding 
instead that the BCRA discriminated based on the identity of the speaker.305  
According to the majority, the First Amendment at its root prohibits Congress 
from punishing citizens or associations of citizens from engaging in political 
speech—and corporations are just another type of association of citizens.306  
Permitting the exemption to extend to all nonprofits—all organizations that 
truly have “associated in a common cause”—would permit Citizens United to 
run its advertisements despite the BCRA prohibition.307  The typical for-profit 
corporation, in contrast, has merely associated for the generic purpose of 
 
 300 From the Citizens United website: 
Citizens United is an organization dedicated to restoring our government to citizens’ control.  
Through a combination of education, advocacy, and grass roots organization, Citizens United 
seeks to reassert the traditional American values of limited government, freedom of enterprise, 
strong families, and national sovereignty and security.  Citizens United’s goal is to restore the 
founding fathers’ vision of a free nation, guided by the honesty, common sense, and good will of 
its citizens. 
Who We Are, CITIZENS UNITED, http://www.citizensunited.org/who-we-are.aspx (last visited May 28, 2011). 
 301 Brief for Appellant at 5, Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (No. 08-205). 
 302 I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (2006).  The subsection further requires that “no part of the net earnings of such 
entity inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.”  Id. 
 303 However, while § 501(c)(4) organizations are exempt from federal (and sometimes state) income 
taxation, donations are not tax deductible to the donor.  See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 215, at 46. 
 304 Citizens United did not qualify outright for the exemption, since it received some donations from for-
profit corporations.  See supra note 293 and accompanying text. 
 305 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 306 Id. 
 307 Id. at 928. 
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making money (and not in any specific region or industry).308  Investment in a 
for-profit entity does not indicate the same kind of interest in a common cause 
that participation in the Republican Party or Greenpeace does, because of the 
lack of organizational identity.  Drawing this distinction seems both principled 
and clean. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article argues that entity form can itself create meaning, by creating a 
type of good incompatible with the profit motive.  It describes the nonprofit 
puzzle: Why would a rational person give to nonprofits knowing that agency 
costs are so poorly constrained?  Existing theories of the firm and the nonprofit 
fail to address this puzzle. 
This Article then lays out psychology’s social identity theory and 
articulates a social identity theory of the nonprofit.  The nonprofit form can 
create a unique warm-glow identity that a for-profit cannot, because the 
salience of the for-profit motive inevitably dims the warm glow that motivates 
the donor to participate in the organization in the first place.  The Article then 
creates a typology of nonprofits, arguing that service-providing nonprofits like 
hospitals are generally not in the identity-creation business, while donative 
nonprofits, trade associations, social clubs, and churches are much more 
identity driven. 
Finally, the Article explores some implications of a social identity theory of 
the nonprofit.  The theory solves the nonprofit agency-cost puzzle and also 
offers a new vantage point from which to view the tax-exemption question.  It 
suggests that nonprofits would persist even if taxed equally with their for-profit 
counterparts, also emphasizing that there are some nonprofit organizations for 
which no for-profit counterpart could exist.  Depending on whether we as a 
society seek to encourage nonprofit identity organizations, we might want to 
tax them more or less favorably than nonprofits that do not provide an identity 
function.  The social identity theory of nonprofits will also have relevance as 
we grapple with how to distinguish nonprofits from for-profits in new contexts 
such as the L3C and campaign finance reform. 
 
 308 Indeed, many corporations’ charters authorize them to exist “for any lawful purpose.”  Don Mayer, 
Fort’s ‘Business as Mediating Institution’—A Holistic View of Corporate Governance and Ethics, 41 AM. 
BUS. L.J. 595, 608 (2004). 
